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Growing economic inequality in the United States has reduced social mobility, placing financial security farther out of
reach for a growing number of Americans. During the COVID19 pandemic, U.S. stock prices have grown simultaneously
with unemployment and food insecurity, highlighting the fact
that prosperity is unequally distributed in the U.S. economy.
Many Americans do not benefit when the stock market
soars because they do not have the means to invest. However, even ordinary American families who do have wealth to
invest in the capital markets will face enormous obstacles in
narrowing the wealth divide through investment. This is because ordinary American investors regularly earn a lower rate
of return from investing than their wealthy counterparts.
Wealthy investors are growing a larger mass of wealth at a
faster rate of return. This makes it virtually impossible for
ordinary investors to catch up.
The disparity in rate of return is the result of both regulation and practicalities that limit the investment options of ordinary investors. Scholars have long acknowledged this
disparity in investment opportunities, and many have proposed lifting regulatory barriers to expand investment access
for ordinary investors. This Article offers a new perspective
focusing on the other side of the wealth divide. That is, perhaps wealthy investors have too many investment
opportunities.
Examining the regulation of short selling as a case study,
this Article demonstrates that when regulating exclusive investments like short selling, regulators focus on investment
products’ impact on the markets with a strong presumption
that more products make for better markets.
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This Article argues that regulators should reexamine the
“more is better” presumption in capital markets regulation in
light of the fact that additional exclusive investment opportunities fuel the wealth divide.
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[T]here is nothing in financial theory that specifies that control
of capital should be confined to a few “fat cats.” . . . Further
perfecting financial institutions and instruments . . . will enable society to enlarge the scope of this prosperity and reverse
the growing trend toward social inequality.1
— Robert Shiller, Nobel Laureate in Economics

INTRODUCTION
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The average U.S. family in the top 1% of the wealth distribution has 274 times the wealth of the median American family.2 Meanwhile, millions of American families have no wealth
at all or even negative wealth.3 This wealth gap has been growing persistently since the 1980s, and Black and Hispanic families are disproportionately represented on the losing side of the
wealth gap.4 The social consequences of this gap have come
into sharp relief during the COVID-19 pandemic as economic
inequality has proven to be an indicator of COVID-19 deaths.5
This trend is deeply troubling not only for those Americans who
must make do with very little today, but also because of what it
suggests about the future. Persistent and increasing economic
inequality can lead to diminished social mobility. Indeed, it
has become increasingly difficult in the last several decades for
Americans born into less wealthy families to climb into better
economic circumstances.6
1

C M
Y K

R

R

06/09/2022 09:20:03

ROBERT J. SHILLER, FINANCE AND THE GOOD SOCIETY 9 (2012).
See Edward N. Wolff, Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962
to 2019: Median Wealth Rebounds . . . But Not Enough 47–50 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 28383, 2021).
3
See id. at 48.
4
Data on other racial or ethnic groups, including Native American and Asian
American families, is often unavailable due to inadequate data. See id. at 30.
5
See infra note 30; Catherine Thorbecke & Arielle Mitropoulos, ‘Extreme
Inequality Was the Preexisting Condition’: How COVID-19 Widened America’s
Wealth Gap, ABC NEWS (June 28, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/extreme-inequality-preexisting-condition-covid-19-widened-americas/
story?id=71401975 [https://perma.cc/BY3S-S9NF].
6
See infra note 52.
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See infra note 34.
Infra section I.A.2.
9
Defined herein as: unincorporated business equity, pension accounts, financial securities, corporate stock, and mutual funds. See infra note 55.
10
Unless otherwise indicated, “wealthy” as used herein refers to the top
quintile of the wealth distribution.
11
Infra section I.B.4.
12
See infra note 123.
13
See infra section II.B.2.
8
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A fundamental component of economic inequality is the
wealth distribution. As used herein, “wealth” refers to the total
value of all the assets a household owns at a particular time,
less their debts.7 The distribution of wealth across U.S. families is an important component of economic inequality because
many forms of wealth—like shares of stock or rental properties—generate income. Families that own income-generating
wealth can therefore turn their existing wealth into more
wealth without spending additional time working. Because of
this ability for wealth to beget more wealth, large disparities in
the distribution of wealth today can have important impacts on
the distribution of economic opportunity in the future.8 Thus,
understanding economic inequality requires an understanding
of wealth disparities. Today, most wealth is held in the form of
financial assets.9 Given that fact, this Article embarks upon an
exploration of whether and how the regulation of financial assets impacts inequality trends.
Wealthy households in the United States not only own
more wealth than other households, but they also own a wider
array of types of wealth.10 Ordinary American families may
own their homes and some retirement savings, but other types
of wealth are scarce. Wealthy households, on the other hand,
often own additional real estate and a broad array of other
financial assets. Retirement savings is the predominant form
of financial wealth held by middle class households. Wealthy
households have retirement savings, but also have access to
many other financial practices that are largely unavailable to
ordinary Americans. This wider array of investment options
allows wealthy investors to earn a higher rate of return on their
investments than ordinary American families, accelerating the
mathematical forces that drive the wealth divide.11 Wealthy
Americans are not only earning investment income on a larger
pool of wealth; they are earning it at a higher rate of return.12
Short selling is an example of a financial practice that is
rarely available to ordinary investors.13 Retirement savings, on
the other hand, are the primary way in which ordinary inves-
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tors participate in the capital markets.14 Examining the regulation of these two practices illuminates how well-intended
variations in their regulation can accelerate the growth of
wealth inequality.
Short selling is a financial strategy used when an investor
wants to bet on the decline of a company. A short seller borrows shares of a company if she thinks the price of those
shares is too high today and will fall in the future. She sells the
shares and buys them back in the future so she can return
them to the person from whom she borrowed them. If, as she
hoped, the price of the shares falls, she is able to buy them
back a lower price than the price at which she sold them. The
difference between the (high) price at which she sold the shares
and the (low) price at which she bought them is her profit from
short selling.
Short sellers need to borrow shares in order to sell them
short, and they often borrow those shares from retirement savings accounts. Thus, the ability to engage in short selling, in a
sense, depends upon the retirement savings of ordinary Americans. Some of the fees that short sellers pay to borrow shares
are passed back to the retirement savers.15 So, the financial
relationship between retirement savings and short selling is
symbiotic, and when viewed in isolation appears to be good for
wealthy and ordinary Americans alike. Though, as this Article
will argue, when viewed through the lens of the growing wealth
gap, it becomes evident that short selling is the type of financial
practice that can also contribute to the entrenchment of economic inequality, notwithstanding any benefits to savers from
share lending fees. This is because a disproportionate share of
the benefits from this symbiotic relationship flow to the already
wealthy.16
A look at the regulatory approaches the United States has
taken to retirement savings and short selling illustrates how
regulatory priorities differ depending on the expected financial
resilience of the investors involved. The regulation of retirement savings is aimed at protecting investors who have retirement accounts.17 Given the importance of retirement savings
for creating financial security, this approach makes sense. It
shields retirement savers from many risky investments, which
protects ordinary investors from unwittingly losing their lim-
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ited wealth. The regulation of short selling, on the other hand,
is largely aimed at protecting and expanding the capital markets themselves. Short selling is an extremely risky practice.
However, for a combination of legal and practical reasons, it is
largely only available to wealthy investors. Freed from concerns about middle class investors losing their meager savings,
the Securities and Exchange Commission’s rulemaking around
short selling securities focuses on maximizing the practice’s
contributions to market price efficiency while minimizing its
contributions to market volatility.18
This bifurcated approach to regulation exists throughout
the capital markets.19 Regulators regularly step in to protect
“main street” investors while trusting wealthier investors to
understand the greater risks presented by more exclusive financial practices. Absent the specter of growing wealth inequality, this bifurcated approach seems quite appropriate. But
research on growing wealth inequality illuminates how the division between ordinary and exclusive investment opportunities
adds fuel to the mathematical forces that already perpetuate
the wealth divide.
An axiom of finance is that greater risk brings greater reward. A riskier investment comes with a greater chance that
you lose your investment, but if you win, the payout is greater.
It is this promise of greater reward that attracts wealthy investors to risky investments. These greater rewards for taking on
risk also contribute to wealthy households’ higher average rate
of return on investment, accelerating the growth of the wealth
divide. A regulatory approach that focuses on the market impact of risky financial practices cannot account for this unfortunate effect of exclusive investments.
Given the potential for exclusive investment practices to
exacerbate the growth of wealth inequality, this Article argues
that the regulation of financial markets in the United States
often operates on a faulty assumption that what is good for the
financial markets is good for the economy. An exclusive financial practice may make a net positive contribution to the health
of the markets while simultaneously growing the wealth divide.
Healthy financial markets are not a policy end in and of themselves. Rather, they are a means to facilitate prosperity across
the real economy. Entrenched inequality is inconsistent with
broad economic prosperity. So, financial regulators in pursuit
of broad economic prosperity need to account for the ways in
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which even well-functioning capital markets can fuel wealth
inequality.
Regulators and scholars have noted the way in which the
current regulatory impetus to shield ordinary investors from
risk inhibits their investment options and potentially their return on investment. To date, most proposed solutions have
focused on increasing ordinary investors’ access to more investment opportunities.20 This Article offers an alternative perspective that regulators and scholars also need to consider
whether wealthy investors have access to too many capital
markets investment opportunities.21
The SEC’s revisions to the regulation of short selling between 2005 and 2010 exemplify the way in which the market
focus expands the availability of exclusive investment opportunities. Before 2005, short selling regulation had not changed
since restrictions were first placed on the practice in 1938. In
2007, the SEC lifted most of those restrictions, making short
selling available much more often. That decision was founded
primarily on a finding that allowing short selling more often
would not have adverse effects on the markets. Importantly,
lifting the restrictions was also not expected to improve market
health. The expected impact was neutral. The SEC’s reasoning
appears guided by a principle that more financial opportunities
are better so long as the markets are not harmed.22 Had the
practice’s contributions to inequality been under consideration, it would have weighed against an expansion of permissible short selling. That would have meant not creating more
opportunities for wealthy investors to earn a higher rate of
return. Indeed, by 2010 the SEC realized that even from a
market-focused perspective, the 2007 repeal had gone too far.
Nevertheless, they were unwilling to revert to the original level
of restriction, opting instead for a compromise.
Short selling is but one of many financial practices that is
disproportionately available to wealthy individuals and also
subject to regulation that determines how much of the practice
should be permitted. In any such case, contributions to wealth
inequality should count among regulatory considerations.
Many such practices may present harder cases than the short
selling case study discussed herein. When an exclusive financial practice really does improve market health, weighing that
benefit against the inequality harm will present a challenge.
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However, the difficulty of that calculation does not mean it can
be ignored. Rather, it requires further study because capital
markets that entrench the extraordinary wealth of a few are
failing in their purpose.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I
describes the troubling growth of economic inequality in the
United States over the last several decades. It identifies
wealthy families’ disproportionate access to many financial
products as a driver of those trends and the role of law in
perpetuating them. Part II examines the regulation of retirement savings and short selling. It points to the divergent policy
priorities that motivate the regulation of each and explains how
this bifurcated regulatory approach is applied throughout the
capital markets. Part III argues that this bifurcated policy focus, while appearing mildly redistributive, obscures exclusive
financial practices’ contribution to growing economic inequality. It argues that this perspective is based on a faulty assumption that more robust financial markets always serve the real
economy. It then returns to the regulation of short selling,
demonstrating how the broader policy perspective advocated
herein would have altered the SEC’s rulemaking on short
selling.
I
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND WEALTH
A. Wealth Disparities as a Driver of Economic Inequality
1. Economic Inequality Trends in the United States

C M
Y K
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23
News stories dedicated to the topic are innumerable and persistent. To
highlight but a few: Lindsay Maizland, Income Inequality in China Is Bad, but It’s
Worse in the US, VOX (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.vox.com/world/2017/2/16/
14636472/income-wealth-inequality-gap-china-bad-us-worse [https://
perma.cc/QDZ3-B46S]; Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, America’s Humongous Wealth
Gap Is Widening Further, FORBES (May 29, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
pedrodacosta/2019/05/29/americas-humungous-wealth-gap-is-widening-further/#2a328cfe42ee, [https://perma.cc/T2WX-GM8P]; Thorbecke & Mitropoulos, supra note 5. Academics and thinktanks have likewise dedicated
extensive attention to the issue. Again, to highlight but a few examples: Isabel V.
Sawhill & Christopher Pulliam, Six Facts About Wealth in the United States,
BROOKINGS UP FRONT BLOG (June 25, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2019/06/25/six-facts-about-wealth-in-the-united-states/ [https://
perma.cc/ZDD7-XNBM]; ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., United States Tackling
High Inequalities Creating Opportunities For All, (June 2014), https://
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In recent years, news outlets, policymakers, academics,
and other members of the public have expressed mounting
concern about economic inequality in the United States.23 Statistics on these trends abound. In the aftermath of the 2008
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financial crisis, the Occupy Wall Street movement drew public
attention to “the one percent”—the top one percent of the
wealth distribution in the United States.24 Economist Joseph
Stiglitz wrote in Vanity Fair in 2011 that the “top 1 percent”
held forty percent of all the wealth in the United States and had
seen their incomes increase eighteen percent over the prior
decade.25 During the same time period middle class wages had
fallen, suggesting that the United States economy was working
for the benefit of a few.26 The economic pie has grown in the
United States in recent decades, but 97.4% of the gains have
gone to the wealthiest 20% of American households.27 Meanwhile, the bottom 40% of U.S. households have seen their average wealth go from positive to negative during the same
period.28 This growth in the economic pie has clearly not resulted in greater prosperity for all.
Economic outcomes cannot be separated from social ones;
indeed, economic outcomes are social outcomes. In 2016, the
median White household had ten times the wealth of the median Black household and eight times the wealth of the median
Hispanic household.29 The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted how economic disparities translate into health outcomes. A recent study identified income inequality as the
second strongest predictor (after population density) of COVID19 deaths in U.S. states.30
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www.oecd.org/unitedstates/Tackling-high-inequalities.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HS29-24JN]; Wolff, supra note 2.
24
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY
ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE xxxix (2013).
25
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Of the 1%, By the 1%, For the 1%, VANITY FAIR,
(May 2011), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/05/top-one-percent201105 [https://perma.cc/S24D-S9AC].
26
See id.
27
Wolff, supra note 2, at 50 (comparing data from 1983 to 2019).
28
Id. (showing that in 1983, the average family in the bottom 40% of the
wealth distribution had $7,000 of net worth in 2019 dollars, and by 2019 that had
fallen to negative $7,200).
29
Other racial groups are not separately identified in this data. Median
wealth was $171,000 for white households, $17,100 for Black households, and
$20,600 for Hispanic households. Rakesh Kochhar & Anthony Cilluffo, How
Wealth Inequality Has Changed in the U.S. Since the Great Recession, by Race,
Ethnicity and Income, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 1, 2017), https://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/01/how-wealth-inequality-haschanged-in-the-u-s-since-the-great-recession-by-race-ethnicity-and-income/
[https://perma.cc/E4SV-XPE6]. For a thorough examination of the historical
origins of Black Americans’ challenges accumulating wealth, see generally
MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP
1–11 (2017).
30
Harold Clarke & Paul Whiteley, Economic Inequality Can Help Predict
COVID-19 Deaths in the US, LSE PHELAN U.S. CTR. (May 6, 2020), https://
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Growing economic inequality in the United States has garnered an extraordinary amount of attention not simply because
some families have more money than others, but because of the
social implications of those disparities. While some economic
inequality is probably inevitable,31 and possibly desirable,32
too much inequality can reduce social mobility.33 Without social mobility, those born less well-off will lack opportunities to
improve their quality of life. A growing number of economists
believe the United States has passed the point at which inequality serves the economy and that instead our current level
of inequality is contributing to troubling social and political
problems.34
Disparities in the quantity of money families have at their
disposal can be measured as disparities in income or disparities in wealth. While both are relevant to analyzing economic
inequality, this paper focuses on the accumulation of wealth as
a determinant of persistent economic inequality.
2. The Importance of Wealth in Understanding Inequality
Economic inequality is usually measured in one of two
ways: inequality of wealth or inequality of income.35 Wealth
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blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2020/05/06/economic-inequality-can-help-predictcovid-19-deaths-in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/AT4J-ZN2B].
31
FACUNDO ALVAREDO, LUCAS CHANCEL, THOMAS PIKETTY, EMANNUEL SAEZ &
GABRIEL ZUCMAN, WORLD INEQUALITY LAB, WORLD INEQUALITY REPORT 2018, at 8
(2018).
32
True Progressivism, ECONOMIST (Oct. 13, 2012), https://
www.economist.com/leaders/2012/10/13/true-progressivisim [https://
perma.cc/F3UU-S8CC] (“[S]ome measure of inequality is good for an economy. It
sharpens incentives to work hard and take risks; it rewards the talented innovators who drive economic progress.”).
33
Id. (“If income gaps get wide enough, they can lead to less equality of
opportunity . . . .”).
34
See, e.g., Olivier Blanchard & Dani Rodrik, We Have the Tools to Reverse
the Rise in Inequality, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Nov. 20, 2019), https://
www.piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/we-have-tools-reverse-rise-inequality [https://perma.cc/6LZ6-23F2] (“Inequality is widening, posing major
moral, social, and political challenges to which policymakers must react.”); Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, The Explosion in U.S. Wealth Inequality Has Been
Fueled by Stagnant Wages, Increasing Debt, and a Collapse in Asset Values for the
Middle Classes, LSE PHELAN U.S. CTR. (Oct. 29, 2014), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
usappblog/2014/10/29/the-explosion-in-u-s-wealth-inequality-has-been-fuelled-by-stagnant-wages-increasing-debt-and-a-collapse-in-asset-values-for-themiddle-classes/ [https://perma.cc/2VEF-MWL4]; Torsten Persson & Guido
Tabellini, Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 600, 617–18
(1994); Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, Distributive Politics and Economic Growth,
109 Q.J. ECON. 465, 474-78 (1994).
35
See generally ALVAREDO, CHANCEL, PIKETTY, SAEZ & ZUCMAN, supra note 31, at
38, 196 (reporting separately on income inequality and wealth inequality for each
studied country).
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refers to the total value of all the assets a household owns at a
particular time less their debts.36 The assets include cash savings, investments, and possibly a home, and the debts include
any outstanding balances on money the household has borrowed.37 Income, on the other hand, refers to the money received by a household over a period of time.38 While wealth
and income are distinctive measures of economic inequality,
they are not unrelated concepts. This is because unspent income becomes wealth, and wealth, in turn, can be a source of
income. An individual or a family can derive income from labor
(wages) or wealth (returns on investment).39 Wages are very
unequally distributed in the United States.40 This disparity in
wages has contributed to and continues to contribute to income inequality, and thereby economic inequality in the United
States.41 However, recent research suggests that since 2000,
wages have ceased to be the primary driver of income inequality. Instead, the returns earned from investing wealth are driving U.S. inequality trends.42
In his widely popular book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty drew worldwide attention to the role of
wealth—as opposed to wages—in entrenching economic inequality.43 Income-producing wealth reproduces itself and
grows. If a family has enough disposable income to spare that
they can invest it, they can increase their income without increasing how much they work. The number of hours an individual can work is finite, but the quantity of investment wealth
a person can accumulate is virtually unlimited.44 Conse-
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36
See BRIAN KEELEY, INCOME INEQUALITY: THE GAP BETWEEN RICH AND POOR
17–29 (2015).
37
See id. at 20.
38
See id. at 19.
39
See id.
40
See, e.g., ELISE GOULD, STATE OF WORKING AMERICA WAGES 2018, at 3–6, 9
(2019) (illustrating wage gaps between genders, races, education, and earning
potential).
41
See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 298
(2013) (illustrating differences in labor income and capital income and connecting
such differences to inequality of total income).
42
ALVAREDO, CHANCEL, PIKETTY, SAEZ & ZUCMAN, supra note 31, at 78 (“While
the upsurge of top incomes was first a labor-income phenomenon in 1980s and
1990s, it has mostly been a capital-income phenomenon since 2000.”).
43
PIKETTY, supra note 41, at 30 (“[T]he process of accumulation and concentration of wealth when growth is weak and the return on capital is high . . . . no
doubt represents the principal threat to an equal distribution of wealth over the
long run.”).
44
The salary a worker can take home does not have a theoretical limit.
However, once a person or family has met their day-to-day needs, any excess
wages become wealth. Unless that wealth is held solely in cash or in another form
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quently, income from wealth is capable of reproducing and
growing much faster than income from labor, and wealth can
be passed on to future generations.45 In this way, wealth’s
durability and capacity to multiply can make it all but certain
that those who have only, or predominantly labor income will
be left behind.46
Piketty’s central claim in Capital was that so long as the
rate of return on private wealth exceeds the rate of growth in
the economy, inequality will tend to increase.47 While Piketty’s
conclusions remain the topic of much debate, there is widespread praise for the enormous quantity of historical data he
compiled and the trends that he identified in that data.48 His
research shows that current trends in the distribution of
wealth look very similar to past eras of extreme and persistent
inequality.49 He warns that without intervention, we may
again enter a period of extreme and persistent inequality, resulting in diminished or nonexistent social mobility.50 A number of other prominent economists have voiced similar
concerns about the entrenchment of wealth disparities.51 The
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that generates no income, these extraordinary wages will contribute additional
income in the form of returns on investing their wealth.
45
See Benjamin Means, Wealth Inequality and Family Businesses, 65 EMORY
L. J. 937, 943 (2016) (“Inheritance practices contribute substantially to wealth
inequality.”).
46
Assuming some people have substantial wealth. EDWARD N. WOLFF, A CENTURY OF WEALTH IN AMERICA xv (2017) (“[T]here is direct survey evidence that intergenerational transfers of wealth may explain upwards of 40 percent of the total
household lifetime accumulation of wealth.”).
47
PIKETTY, supra note 41, at 25–27. He warned that if this imbalance persisted over years and decades, the already wealthy will multiply their wealth such
that others will be unable to catch up. Eventually, wealth will be determined by
inheritance and social mobility will be lost. See id.
48
Marshall Steinbaum, Why AAre Economists Giving Piketty the Cold Shoulder?, BOS. REV. (May 12, 2017), http://bostonreview.net/class-inequality/marshall-steinbaum-why-are-economists-giving-piketty-cold-shoulder [https://
perma.cc/E8AD-LH4E] (“[D]espite Piketty’s resonance with public experience and
apparent applicability to the economic environment of global finance, his book
was mostly greeted with hostility by the academic economics profession.”).
Steinbaum goes on to note that Piketty’s collection of historical data and statistics
garners widespread praise even among his critics. Id. He attributes Piketty’s
hostile reception to inertia in the economics academy. Id.
49
PIKETTY, supra note 41, at 440 (comparing U.S. inequality in 2010 to “the
Gilded Age, when some US industrialists and financiers . . . accumulated unprecedented wealth”).
50
Id. at 26.
51
See WOLFF, supra note 46, at xiii (discussing wealth trends: “[t]here is clear
evidence of a growing bifurcation in the United States between the ‘favored fifth’
and almost all the rest”); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Inequality and Economic Growth, in
RETHINKING CAPITALISM: ECONOMICS AND POLICY FOR SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE
GROWTH 134, 136 (Michael Jacobs & Mariana Mazzucato eds., 2016) (noting that
the wealthiest Americans temporarily lost a great deal of wealth during the reces-
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problem with wealth inequality is that the larger it gets, the
more entrenched it becomes. Entrenched inequality means
those born into families with little or no wealth will have scant
hope of changing their circumstances. And indeed, social mobility has been declining in the United States as wealth inequality has been growing.52
While the distribution of wealth today is approaching that
of prior very unequal eras, today’s wealth takes a much different form from the wealth of the past.
3. The Role of Law in Determining the Value of Modern
Wealth
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sion, but they regained this lost wealth during the recovery while ordinary Americans did not).
52
See Michael Hout, Social Mobility, PATHWAYS, special Issue 2019, at 29, 29
(“American men and women born since 1980—the millennials—have been less
upwardly mobile than previous generations of Americans.”); Raj Chetty et al., The
Fading American Dream: Trends in Absolute Income Mobility Since 1940, at ii (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22910, Dec. 2016), http://
www.nber.org/papers/w22910 [https://perma.cc/6SBJ-YAQ3] (finding that
rates of income mobility “have fallen from approximately 90% for children born in
1940 to 50% for children born in the 1980s.”).
53
PIKETTY, supra note 41, at vii.
54
KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND
INEQUALITY 24 (2019).
55
Wolff, supra note 2, at 51 tbl.5 (showing that, as of 2019, unincorporated
business equity, pension accounts, financial securities, corporate stock, and mutual funds constituted 51.9% of all household wealth in the United States).
56
PISTOR, supra note 54, at 3.
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Piketty’s work is remarkable, in part, because of the historical reach of his data. His data for some European countries
reaches back to the eighteenth century and for the United
States to the start of the twentieth century.53 Until the early
twentieth century, rural land was the most important source of
wealth globally.54 Today, financial assets have become the predominant component of personal wealth in the United States.55
Financial assets differ from land in that how they create income
is far less tangible.
Land is a physical asset. It creates income when it is
leased to another person or used to grow crops or produce
other goods for sale. The crops for sale or the property for lease
are physical assets that a purchaser consumes.56 So, the
amount of income generated by land, to a substantial extent, is
determined by what a consumer is willing to pay for these
tangible products the land generates. Even with these tangible
sources of income, the laws and legal structures that apply still
meaningfully affect the value and income-producing capacity of
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that land.57 Financial assets lack the tangibility of land. Consequently, as Professor Katharina Pistor has described, law is
even more determinative of the value of financial assets.58
Financial assets don’t exist in physical form. For example,
a share of stock in a corporation is not a tangible thing that can
produce anything of value absent a collection of contracts.59 A
corporation itself is nothing more than a legal fiction created by
statute to facilitate the pooling of resources for joint production.60 A corporation exists as a consequence of a statute allowing for its creation and its formative documents which
describe how it will operate.61 Those same documents will define the rights of shareholders (investors) in the corporation.62
The formative documents will also determine the liquidity of
the shares and whether and how shareholders will be paid
dividends. All of these rights contribute to the value that a
given investor is willing to place on the share of stock, and all
exist in legal documents alone. While many of these contracts
are agreements involving only private parties, the contracts the
parties enter into would be of little value absent a legal system
that recognizes and enforces those contracts and a market
where stocks can be traded.63
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57
Id. at 24 (noting that in order to increase the value of land,
“[l]andowners . . . found lawyers who set up a trust or corporate entity to which
assets could be transferred, and thereby protected from various groups of creditors”); see also id. at 38 (describing how an English law adopted in 1880, which
empowered creditors to enforce against family estates, affected wealthy families’
ability to maintain their wealth in perpetuity).
58
Id. at 3; see also Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP.
ECON. 315, 315 (2013).
59
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308
(1976) (“Since the specification of rights is generally effected through contracting
(implicit as well as explicit), individual behavior in organizations, including the
behavior of managers, will depend upon the nature of these contracts.”).
60
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 269 (1999).
61
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (2021); see PISTOR, supra note 54, at
48 (describing corporations as a combination of contracts and public laws that
protect the firm’s assets).
62
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211–212, 220, 251(c), 327 (2021). These
rights most commonly include the rights to elect directors to the board, vote on
major transactions, inspect corporate books and records, and file derivative suits.
See Emily Winston, Benefit Corporations and the Separation of Benefit and Control, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1783, 1809 (2018).
63
PISTOR, supra note 54, at 17 (“[L]aw that is backed by the threat of coercive
enforcement increases the likelihood that the commitments that private parties
made to one another and the privileges they obtained will be recognized and
enforced . . . .”).
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Thus, financial assets—whether shares of corporate stock
or investments in a short-selling hedge fund—owe their existence and value to the legal structures that create and apply to
them.64 This legal “coding” includes any regulatory restrictions
placed on creating or investing in a particular financial asset.
If regulators allow a financial asset to exist, then the value of a
financial asset is determined by the contracts entered into by
private parties that create the asset and the public legal system
that recognizes and enforces those contracts.65 But the existence of a financial asset is dependent on law and regulation.
Regulators can eliminate short selling and the ability to profit
from it. Indeed, they have done so, briefly, in the past.66
Given the centrality of law in determining the value of financial wealth, this paper will begin to explore how our regulatory approach to financial investments affects the value of
investments held by wealthy and less wealthy investors. To do
so, it examines the regulation of retirement savings and short
selling. These financial practices, perhaps surprisingly, are
closely linked. Shares held by retirement savers are an important source of the loaned shares required for short selling.
Despite this connection, these financial practices are not
equally available to all Americans.67
B. The Composition and Distribution of Wealth in the
United States
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Id. at 3.
Id. at 217.
66
See infra note 230.
67
Short selling is but one of many examples of a financial practice that is
disproportionately available to the already wealthy. Discussing all such practices
would be impossible. This particular set of financial practices was chosen as a
starting point for the reasons described in subpart II.B herein.
68
“Ordinary” Americans as used herein refers to roughly the bottom 80–90%
of the wealth distribution in the United States. The intent of this term is to
capture the vast majority of Americans who are not exceptionally wealthy.
65
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As discussed above, in the last several decades, wealth in
the U.S. economy has come to be overwhelmingly held in the
hands of a small number of households. The wealth of the
wealthiest Americans and that of “ordinary” Americans are not
only distinguishable in terms of quantity.68 Households at different points on the wealth distribution also tend to hold very
different types of wealth. This section explores those distinctions and their implications for the accumulation of wealth over
time.
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1. The Wealth of “Ordinary” Americans
Many American families have no wealth at all. By some
estimates, nearly 20% of U.S. households have zero or negative
wealth,69 and non-White families are much more likely to fall
into this category than White families.70 This means that the
assets these households own are not worth more than the debt
they owe.71 These families have few or no opportunities to earn
income from wealth and are therefore largely limited to their
labor as a source of income. This is deeply problematic. If
these families’ income is insufficient to allow them to save and
therefore accumulate wealth, they are likely living “paycheck to
paycheck,” a very precarious financial situation.72
While a distressingly large number of U.S. households
have zero or negative wealth, most American families do have
some positive wealth. In 2016, the median U.S. household had
positive wealth of $100,800.73 For American households in the
middle 60% of the wealth distribution,74 the majority of their
wealth—61.9%—is held in the form of their home.75 The next
greatest component of middle-class wealth is defined contribution retirement savings (“retirement savings”), which constitute
16.6% of these households’ wealth.76
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69
Edward Wolff estimates that as of 2019, 19.6% of U.S. households had zero
or negative wealth. Wolff, supra note 2, at 47 tbl.1. But see Giacomo De Giorgi,
Olivier Armantier, Luis Armona & Wilbert van der Klaauw, What is Negative
Wealth and Who Does It Affect?, WORLD ECON. F. (Aug. 5, 2016), https://
www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/08/what-is-negative-wealth-and-who-does-itaffect [https://perma.cc/AEK2-AFG4] (estimating that 15.1% of U.S. households
have zero or negative wealth but noting that this figure varies across studies due
to variances in survey methodology).
70
Lisa J. Dettling et al., Recent Trends in Wealth-Holding by Race and Ethnicity: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, FEDS NOTES (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/recent-trends-inwealth-holding-by-race-and-ethnicity-evidence-from-the-survey-of-consumer-finances-20170927.htm [https://perma.cc/N5WW-G3XG] (showing that in 2016,
9% of White families had zero or negative wealth, as compared to 19% of Black
families, 13% of Hispanic families, and 14% of families in other non-White
groups).
71
See Di Giorgi, Armantier, Armona & van der Klaauw, supra note 69 (“[A]
household’s total debt may exceed its total assets, in which case it has ‘‘negative
wealth.’”).
72
Id. (“[Negative wealth] may affect the household’s ability to save for durable
goods, restrict access to further credit, and may require living in a state of limited
consumption.”).
73
Wolff, supra note 2, at 42 tbl.1.
74
Meaning all households except the 20% wealthiest households and the
20% least wealthy households.
75
Id. at 49 tbl.6. Sixty-seven percent of households in this group owns a
primary residence. Id.
76
Id. at 6, 49 tbl.6 (explaining that “pension accounts” as used in this study
does not include defined benefit pension plans).
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A principal residence is an important form of wealth for
economic security.77 A principal residence provides a family
with a home, reducing housing insecurity. Ideally, a principal
residence will also appreciate in value over time, increasing the
owner’s wealth. Homeowners can borrow against the equity in
their home, and that access to credit is an additional source of
economic security. Moreover, primary residences can be
passed on to heirs, which allows these benefits to persist
across generations.78 Thus, ownership of a primary residence
can undoubtedly be an important source of wealth for American households.
Nonetheless, these benefits are not universally available to
all homeowners; many of the benefits of homeownership are
less often enjoyed by minority homeowners.79 Moreover,
homes, unlike financial assets, are highly illiquid.80 It is not
easy for a family to turn the value of their principal residence
into cash that can be spent on consumption, if needed. And,
other than appreciation in value, a principal residence does not
usually generate income.81
Retirement savings—the second most prevalent type of
wealth among ordinary Americans—can, and should, generate
income in the short and medium term. Retirement savings are
generally invested, through mutual funds, in publicly traded
stocks and bonds.82 We invest our retirement savings so that
the amount we invest today grows by the time we retire. Retire-
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77
See James Herbert Williams, Economic Security and Home Ownership, 38
SOC. WORK RSCH. , 3 (2014) (“Home ownership and savings are primary avenues
for low-income families and individuals to build wealth, economic assets, and
security.”). But see Jenny Schuetz, Renting the American Dream: Why Homeownership Shouldn’t Be a Prerequisite for Middle-Class Financial Security, BROOKINGS:
UP FRONT (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2019/02/
13/renting-the-american-dream-why-homeownership-shouldnt-be-a-pre-requisite-for-middle-class-financial-security/ [https://perma.cc/9UTF-VDUE] (arguing that homeownership is not a fundamental need due to the financial risks and
costs associated with maintaining a home).
78
See BARADARAN, supra note 29, at 9 (“Especially for families on the bottom
rung, owning a home provides a substantial buffer against the harshest edges of
poverty, a stable foundation that can be passed down to the next generation.”).
79
WILLIAM DARITY JR. ET AL., SAMUEL DUBOIS COOK CTR. ON SOC. EQUITY, WHAT
WE GET WRONG ABOUT CLOSING THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP 29–30 (2018), https://
socialequity.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/what-we-get-wrong.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JE6W-V2B8] (citing racial disparities in access to mortgages,
quality of mortgages, appreciation of equity and intergenerational transfers).
80
Wolff, supra note 2, at 6 (“[O]ne’s home is difficult to convert into cash in
the short term.”).
81
There are, of course, exceptions. For example, an owner could rent out a
room in their principal residence.
82
See Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 960 (2013).
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ment savings are crucial to economic security since social security benefits are currently inadequate to maintain a person’s
standard of living post-retirement.83 Retirement savings earn
income because they are invested in financial assets.84 So,
those middle-class households who have retirement savings—
roughly half—own financial assets.85 Very few middle-class
families own any financial assets other than their retirement
accounts.86
Retirement savings differ in important ways from financial
assets that are held outside of retirement accounts. Retirement savings are meant to spread out consumption over our
lifetimes, and the goal is to maintain the investor’s standard of
living post-retirement.87 Even when retirement savings earn
income and grow as hoped, they do not make a person “richer”
in the colloquial sense of the term; this income does not make
its owner capable of buying more things today.88 And while
unused retirement savings will be passed on to the saver’s
heirs, this is not the usual or primary function of retirement
savings.
Thus, the kind of financial wealth that ordinary Americans
are most likely to hold is largely wealth that creates important
economic security but will not produce income that improves a
family’s standard of living. If all goes according to plan, these
savings will merely maintain the saver’s existing standard of
83

See JENNIFER ERIN BROWN, JOELLE SAAD-LESSLER & DIANE OAKLEY, NAT’L INST.
RET. SEC., RETIREMENT IN AMERICA: OUT OF REACH FOR WORKING AMERICANS? 2
(2018), https://www.nirsonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/FINAL-Report-.pdf [perma.cc/Q54F-99U9] (“To maintain their standard of living in retirement, the typical working American needs to replace roughly 85 percent of preretirement income. . . . Social Security, under the current benefit formula, provides a replacement rate of roughly 35 percent for a typical household.”).
84
See infra note 168.
85
Approximately 50% of U.S. households have retirement savings. See
MONIQUE MORRISSEY, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE STATE OF AMERICAN RETIREMENT SAVINGS:
HOW THE SHIFT TO 401(K)S HAS INCREASED GAPS IN RETIREMENT PREPAREDNESS BASED
ON INCOME, RACE, ETHNICITY, EDUCATION, AND MARITAL STATUS 12 fig.8 (2019), https:/
/files.epi.org/pdf/136219.pdf [perma.cc/5QNC-7N93]; BROWN, SAAD-LESSLER &
OAKLEY, supra note 83, at 7 fig.4. Defined benefit plans are another form of
retirement savings that are not the focus of this discussion. This is in part
because they are excluded from retirement savings in some sources. Moreover,
participation in defined benefit plans is decreasing. See infra section II.A.1.
86
Wolff, supra note 2, at 49 tbl.6 (showing that only 15.3% of middle-class
families own “[c]orporate stock, financial securities, mutual funds, and personal
trusts” and only 7.8% own unincorporated business equity).
87
See BROWN, SAAD-LESSLER & OAKLEY, supra note 83, at 2.
88
Except with a substantial tax penalty. Topic No. 558 Additional Tax on
Early Distributions from Retirement Plans Other than IRAs, IRS, https://
www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc558 [perma.cc/P4XN-5M53] (last updated Mar. 1717,
2021).
ON

R

R

06/09/2022 09:20:03

R

43781-crn_107-3 Sheet No. 87 Side B

C M
Y K

R

43781-crn_107-3 Sheet No. 88 Side A

06/09/2022 09:20:03

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\107-3\CRN303.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 19

UNEQUAL INVESTMENT

4-JUN-22

13:52

799

C M
Y K

R

R
R
R

06/09/2022 09:20:03

89
MORRISSEY, supra note <CITE _Ref83247395“>, at 8 fig.5 (“Most families—
even those approaching retirement—have little or no retirement savings.”).
90
Exact percentages vary by study based on survey methodology. See, e.g.,
id. at 6 (estimating that 58% of “prime-age” families in the U.S. had retirement
account savings in 2016); BROWN, SAAD-LESSLER & OAKLEY, supra note 83, at 7 fig.4
(“Almost 60 [p]ercent of all [w]orking [a]ge [i]ndividuals [d]o [n]ot [o]wn [a]ssets in a
[r]etirement [a]ccount.”).
91
MORRISSEY, supra note 85, at 14 fig.10 (“Most black and Hispanic families
have no retirement account savings.”).
92
BROWN, SAAD-LESSLER & OAKLEY, supra note 83, at 15.
93
MORRISSEY, supra note 85, at 15 (“In 2016, the median white non-Hispanic
family with retirement savings had over three times as much saved in a retirement
account ($79,500) as the median Hispanic family with savings ($23,000) and
nearly three times as much as the median black family with savings ($29,200).”).
94
Id. at 23.
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living. Moreover, even though retirement savings are the second greatest component of wealth for middle-class households,
the retirement savings that Americans do hold are largely inadequate to allow their owners to retire with the economic security these savings are meant to create.89
By some estimations, approximately half of Americans
have no retirement savings,90 and Black and Hispanic families
are disproportionately represented among those with no retirement savings at all.91 Across all working Americans, over seventy percent have insufficient wealth to support retirement,
even using a very low benchmark savings goal.92 And again,
Black and Hispanic families endure a disproportionate share of
the burden, with median retirement account balances substantially below those of non-Hispanic White families.93 Seventy percent of the balance of retirement savings held by
Americans is held by the top 20% of the income distribution.94
So, retirement savings are decidedly inadequate for all but the
wealthiest Americans.
Notwithstanding their inadequacies, retirement savings remain the predominant way in which ordinary Americans participate in the markets for financial products. They are
therefore the primary way in which ordinary Americans’ money
is subject to capital market regulation. At the same time, it is a
clear example of the immediate effects of wealth inequality in
the United States. The inadequacy of wealth accumulation
puts an economically secure retirement out of reach for most
Americans. Therefore, retirement savings are a useful starting
point for exploring the relationship between financial regulation and economic inequality.

43781-crn_107-3 Sheet No. 88 Side B

06/09/2022 09:20:03

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\107-3\CRN303.txt

800

unknown

Seq: 20

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

4-JUN-22

13:52

[Vol. 107:781

2. The Wealth of the Wealthy
Households in the upper echelons of the U.S. wealth distribution also count primary residences and retirement savings
among their sources of wealth, though with much greater frequency. Over 94% of households in the top quintile of the
wealth distribution own a principal residence, and over 80%
have defined contribution retirement savings.95 In addition to
their homes and retirement savings, these wealthy households
also own other types of assets with much greater frequency
than less wealthy households.96
Nearly one half of the top quintile of the wealth distribution
owns real estate other than their primary residence.97 Nearly
one third own equity in non-corporate businesses.98 Nearly
two thirds own corporate stock, financial securities, mutual
funds, and personal trusts.99 These additional sources of
wealth notably have the ability to grow these households’
wealth without additional labor. Real estate other than one’s
primary residence can be rented out to generate income. Unincorporated business equity, corporate stock, financial securities, and mutual funds are all financial assets that are
purchased virtually exclusively for their financial returns.
These types of assets that are predominantly owned by the
wealthy contribute to the tendency of wealth to beget more
wealth and thereby entrench economic inequality.100
3. Explaining the Division
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Wolff, supra note 2, at 52 tbl.6.
See id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Other than that which comprises their retirement savings. Id.
100
Notably, intergenerational wealth transfers have not been a major contributor to the recent growth of inequality in the United States. Rather, it is life-cycle
wealth accumulation that has been the driving force in the recent increase in
wealth inequality. Wolff, supra note 46, at 304-10.
101
See Williams, supra note 77, at 3.
96
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A number of factors converge to explain why wealthy Americans’ wealth is so much more diverse than that of ordinary
Americans. Perhaps the most obvious factor is the simple fact
that wealthy households have more money to invest. Owning a
home and saving for retirement are foundations of economic
security.101 It is logical that until those two basic needs have
been met, most families will not invest their money in other
forms of wealth. The number of working-age Americans with
insufficient retirement savings demonstrates that, for most
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American families, these basic financial needs are not met.102
Wealthy families, on the other hand, have surplus wealth to
invest beyond retirement savings, potentially increasing their
consumption in the short run or passing on wealth to descendants in the long run. Ordinary Americans often do not have
adequate money to invest for these purposes.103
A regulatory factor contributing to the different composition of wealth among wealthy and ordinary Americans is the
Securities Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) rule known as the
accredited investor standard.104 The accredited investor standard limits who can purchase securities that have not been
registered with the SEC.105 When a company registers its securities with the SEC, it is subject to extensive reporting requirements and oversight.106 The regulation of registered
securities is designed to make comprehensive and accurate
information widely available to investors to facilitate informed
investment choices.107 A company that has not registered with
the SEC, and is therefore “private,” is subject to less extensive
regulation.108 Thus, if a company does not want to incur the
costs of registering with the SEC, it can remain a private company, and it will be largely restricted to seeking investments
from “accredited investors.”109 As currently formulated, the
accredited investor standard largely limits unregistered investments to individuals with a net worth of at least one million
dollars or an annual income over $200,000.110 A recent
102
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See MORRISSEY, supra note 85, at 6.
See Wolff, supra note 2, at 52 tbl.6.
104
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2020).
105
SEC, Updated Investor Bulletin: Accredited Investors, I NVESTOR.GOV
(Apr. 14, 2021), https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/general-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletins/updated-3 [perma.cc/
82SK-TEMY] [hereinafter SEC, Updated Investor Bulletin].
106
See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f–g (requiring a registration
statement for publicly offered securities); id. § 77g(c) (prescribing disclosure requirements for registered securities); Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78
(same).
107
See SEC, Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, INVESTOR.GOV,
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/registration-under-securities-act-1933 [perma.cc/E4MH-SL6A] (last visited
Feb. 22, 2021) (“The Securities Act of 1933 has two basic objectives: [t]o require
that investors receive financial and other significant information concerning securities being offered for public sale; and [t]o prohibit deceit, misrepresentations,
and other fraud in the sale of securities.”).
108
See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1 (exempting transactions
not involving any public offering from registration).
109
See Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504, 230.506.
110
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6) (“Accredited investor shall mean . . . [a]ny
natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person’s
spouse or spousal equivalent, exceeds $1,000,000 . . . [or] [a]ny natural person
103
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amendment to the rule expanded the definition of an accredited
investor to include certain financial professionals who are
deemed financially sophisticated, even if they do not meet the
net worth requirement.111
The types of investments that the accredited investor standard largely restricts to wealthy investors include: direct investments in stock or other securities offered by companies
that haven’t “gone public,” venture capital funds that pool
money to invest in promising startup ventures, and the class of
investment funds colloquially referred to as “hedge funds.”112
While the term “hedge fund” has no formal legal definition, it
generally refers to lightly regulated investment funds that often
pursue riskier investment strategies than those available to
ordinary investors.113 One such investment strategy commonly used by hedge funds is short selling.114
The policy justification for the accredited investor standard
is to protect vulnerable investors from less regulated and thus
presumably riskier investments. The accredited investor standard aims to filter out investors who (1) lack the financial
know-how to understand the risks involved and (2) lack the
wealth to weather potential losses.115 But, as currently formulated, the wealth requirement is the predominant determinant
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who had an individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most
recent years or joint income with that person’s spouse or spousal equivalent in
excess of $300,000 in each of those years and has a reasonable expectation of
reaching the same income level in the current year.”).
111
The relevant changes appear in 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(10), which adds to
the definition of accredited investor “[a]ny natural person holding in good standing one or more professional certifications or designations or credentials from an
accredited educational institution that the Commission has designated as qualifying an individual for accredited investor status,” and 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(11),
which adds “[a]ny natural person who is a ‘knowledgeable employee[ ]’ . . . of the
issuer of the securities being offered or sold.”
112
See SEC, Updated Investor Bulletin, supra note 105.
113
See SEC, Hedge Funds, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/investment-products/private-investment-funds/
hedge-funds [perma.cc/2V6Y-3FPB] (last visited Feb. 22, 2021).
114
See Peter Molk & Frank Partnoy, Institutional Investors as Short Sellers?,
99 B.U. L. REV. 837, 844 (2019) (pointing out that other, less exclusive institutional investors could engage in short selling, but in practice it is largely only a
subset of hedge funds that do so).
115
See SEC, Updated Investor Bulletin, supra note 105. For most of its existence, the accredited investor standard did not in any way screen for investor
sophistication. Rather, it made an implicit assumption that those whose wealth
or income meets the threshold have the requisite sophistication to understand the
risks of investment. This assumption has long been widely criticized. See, e.g.,
Manning Gilbert Warren III, A Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption
Regimen for Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U. L. REV.
355, 381–82 (1984) (criticizing the accreditation of investors based on their
wealth, income, or amount of purchase); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B.
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of whether an individual or household is deemed an accredited
investor. The recent amendments expanding the definition to
include other financially sophisticated investors have added a
very small number of households to the definition.116 So, in its
current form, the accredited investor standard draws a regulatory divide between the investments of the wealthy and those of
ordinary Americans.117
A final factor that contributes to the distinctions in the
composition of wealth of wealthy and ordinary Americans is
access. Regardless of whether regulatory obstacles exist that
would formally exclude ordinary investors, wealthy individuals
have access to social networks and investment advisors that
can connect them to investment opportunities that ordinary
Americans do not have.118 Hedge fund managers have complete discretion over to whom they grant access to their
funds.119 Consequently, it can be very difficult for those without a personal connection to the fund to invest.120 Private
funds also have “minimum buy-ins,” meaning that you can
only invest if you are willing and able to invest a minimum
amount.121 Those minimums are almost always over $100,000
and can go well into the millions.122 Without elite investment
advisors or networks of wealthy contacts, many unaccredited
investors would have difficulty locating these exclusive investments even absent the accredited investor standard. And, even
if they could find these investments, they would often lack the
wealth necessary to invest.
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Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act,
101 GEO. L.J. 337, 362–63 (2013) (same).
116
See Amending the “Accredited Investor” Definition, Release Nos. 33-10824,
34-89669 (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2020/33-10824.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R8PD-GWFY] (noting that “the upper bound estimate” for how
many new individuals will become accredited investors under the new definition is
a 4% increase, representing 0.2% of the overall investing population).
117
This effect of the accredited investor standard has led Professor Usha Rodrigues to conclude that “government intervention has created an investing climate
that lets the rich get richer, while the poor get left behind.” Usha Rodrigues,
Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3389–90 (2013).
118
See Coryanne Hicks, How to Find a Financial Advisor if You’re Not Rich,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 8, 2021), https://money.usnews.com/investing/
investing-101/articles/how-to-find-a-financial-advisor-if-youre-not-rich
[perma.cc/6UX8-MQAF]. The author of this Article worked as a bank teller in
college and was instructed in that role to offer the bank’s financial advisory
services only to customers with sufficiently high account balances.
119
Joshua Kennon, Investing in a Hedge Fund Can Be Difficult, THE BALANCE,
https://www.thebalance.com/investing-in-a-hedge-fund-can-be-difficult357523 [perma.cc/8DUR-4QMC] (last updated Oct. 25, 2020).
120
Id.
121
See id.
122
See id.
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While the accredited investor standard creates regulatory
barriers to many investments for ordinary Americans, other
more fundamental factors also explain why ordinary Americans’ wealth is less diverse than that of wealthy families. Foremost, many American households simply lack adequate money
to invest beyond the relatively fundamental necessities of
purchasing a home and saving for retirement. Beyond that,
even if they had adequate money, many Americans likely lack
the personal connections, familiarity with investment options,
and time to find other investment opportunities.
4. Implications of Wealth Composition: Unequal Returns
Wealthy and ordinary Americans differ in the quantity of
wealth they own and the composition of that wealth. They also
differ in the rate at which their wealth grows. Wealthy investors earn a greater per-dollar rate of return on their investments than less wealthy investors.123
This disparity in rate of return is tied to the different forms
of wealth to which wealthy investors have access.124 Wealthy
households are much more broadly and deeply invested in the
financial markets than ordinary American households.125 Financial assets outside of retirement savings consistently earn a
higher rate of return than other forms of wealth,126 but for the
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123
See Wolff, supra note 2, at 57 tbl.11 (showing that the average annual rates
of return on gross assets were greater for the top 20% than the middle three
quintiles of the wealth distribution for all periods from 1983–2019). The same
table shows the trend reversing for the rates of return on net worth, with middle
class rates of return consistently exceeding those of the top 20%. This is attributable to the much higher relative debt load of the middle class. See id. at 25; see
also PIKETTY, supra note 41, at 545 (“[A]round the world, the largest fortunes
(including inherited ones) have grown at very high rates in recent decades . . . significantly higher than the average growth rate of wealth.”).
124
See Wolff, supra note 2, at 20–21 (“The differences [in rate of return among
wealth groups] reflected the greater share of high yield investment assets like
stocks in the portfolios of the rich and the greater share of housing in the portfolio
of the middle class.”); see also Robert M. Solow, Thomas Piketty is Right, in AFTER
PIKETTY: THE AGENDA FOR ECONOMICS AND INEQUALITY 48, 56 (Heather Boushey, J.
Bradford DeLong & Marshall Steinbaum eds., 2017) (“Income from wealth is
probably even more concentrated than wealth itself because, as Piketty notes,
large blocks of wealth tend to earn a higher return than small ones. Some of this
advantage comes from economies of scale, but more may come from the fact that
very big investors have access to a wider range of investment opportunities than
smaller investors.”).
125
See Wolff, supra note 46, at 91 (showing that 85% of the top 20% of U.S.
households (by wealth) owned stocks directly or indirectly in 2013, while only
41% of the middle three quintiles owned stock).
126
Id. at 65 tbl.1 (showing that from 1983–2019 the rate of return on financial
assets exceeded the rate of return on pension accounts and residential real estate
in all periods except the financially turbulent decade from 2001–2010).
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127
Id. at 52 tbl.6 (showing that only 15.3% of the middle three quintiles of the
wealth distribution own “[c]orporate stock, financial securities, mutual funds, and
personal trusts”).
128
PIKETTY, supra note 41, at 431.
129
Wolff, supra note 2, at 68 app. tbl.1.
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reasons described above, ordinary Americans rarely own financial assets besides their retirement savings.127 Additionally,
wealthy investors have access to financial advisors who may
provide investment advice that allows them to invest more profitably than ordinary Americans.128 So, the fact that wealthy
Americans have access to a larger menu of income-producing
assets makes them capable of growing their wealth at a faster
pace than Americans of more modest means. And they can do
so in a way that can make them “richer.” That is, they are
growing wealth that is not serving the basic needs of providing
a home or a secure retirement. It is surplus wealth that can
increase consumption in the short term and can be passed on
to heirs in the long term.
This disparity in rate of return and wealth composition has
important implications for inequality trends. It means there
are two distinct but simultaneous mathematical forces that are
preventing ordinary Americans from catching up with their
wealthy counterparts: both the quantity of wealth held by the
wealthy and their ability to grow that wealth at a faster rate
than ordinary Americans.
For example, from 2016 to 2019, the average annual rate of
return on defined contribution pension accounts in the United
States was 7.45%, while the average annual rate of return on
other financial assets was 9.34%.129 The chart below compares how that disparity in rate of return would affect the total
return, over twenty years, of a modest $100 monthly investment versus a more extravagant $10,000 monthly investment.
At either rate of return, it is quite evident how invested wealth
grows the wealth divide. But with the wealthy investor earning
a higher rate of return, it grows much faster. At the higher rate
of return, the wealthy investor’s investment is 27% greater
than it would be at the lower rate of return available for defined
contribution retirement accounts.
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20 Years
at 9.34%

Ordinary Investor:

$100

$55,476

Not available

Wealthy Investor:

$10,000

$5,547,584

$7,039,025130

Given these dual forces affecting wealth accumulation, it is
unsurprising that the bottom 80% of U.S. households have
seen their share of wealth decrease consistently over the last
forty years.131 If wealthy investors are earning a higher rate of
return on a larger stock of wealth, the gap between the wealthiest Americans and everyone else can only grow. As was discussed above, the bigger that gap grows, the harder it is to
undo. And while disparate rates of return are only part of the
story, they act as an accelerant to the growth of wealth inequality via invested wealth.
This section has described the differences in the composition of wealth owned by wealthy and ordinary Americans, the
regulatory and extra-regulatory structures that create that divide, and the way those distinctions allow wealthy investors to
grow their wealth faster than ordinary Americans. The following Part examines how the regulatory strategies applied to financial investments differ for exclusive and ordinary
investments. To do so, it takes a closer look at two financial
practices that exemplify this divide: retirement savings and
short selling. It describes how these two practices, while not
equally available to all Americans, are intertwined, and it explores the regulatory approaches applied to each.
43781-crn_107-3 Sheet No. 91 Side B

II
REGULATING FINANCIAL WEALTH
A. Goals of Capital Markets and their Regulation
Before examining specific instances of regulating financial
investment, it is worth examining the role that financial mar-
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130
Calculations made by compounding interest monthly on consistent
monthly contributions over twenty years. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Compound Interest Calculator, INVESTOR.GOV https://www.investor.gov/financial-tools-calculators/calculators/compound-interest-calculator [https://
perma.cc/Q2NG-8FQ9]. The formula for this calculation is: Total = [ P(1®/n)^(nt)
] + [ PMT × (((1 + r/n)^(nt) - 1) / (r/n)) ], where P = the principal investment amount
(here, $100 or $10,000), r = the annual interest rate (here, .0745 or .0934), t = the
time the money is invested (here, 20 years), n = the number of times that interest
is compounded per unit t (here, 12 for monthly compounding), and PMT = the
monthly investment (here, $100 or $10,000).
131
See Wolff, supra note 2, at 48 tbl.2.
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kets play in the economy and the motivation for their regulation. The term “financial markets” refers to the markets where
an array of financial products are traded.132 The practices
studied in this paper—retirement savings and short selling
stocks—are largely confined to the capital markets, where
stocks and bonds issued by companies are traded. In the
United States, primary responsibility for regulating the capital
markets lies with the SEC.133 The SEC’s tripartite mission is:
“to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation.”134 With this mission as
a starting point, this Part explores what public benefit we hope
to attain when regulating financial markets and, more specifically the capital markets.
1. Function of Financial Markets
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132
See JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 23 (2016)
(“[F]inancial markets [are markets] such as equity markets, bond markets, derivative and options markets, futures and commodity markets, and ancillary actors
which facilitate the production and dissemination of information that enable markets to operate.”).
133
The SEC was given this function by the Exchange Act of 1934. See Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78.
134
About the SEC, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml [perma.cc/42JMC6MR] (last updated Nov. 22, 2016).
135
Ben Winck, Here are the 10 Biggest Stock Exchanges in the World, Ranked
by Market Cap, INSIDER: MARKETS INSIDER (June 19, 2020), https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/biggest-stock-exchanges-world-rankedmarket-cap-nyse-nasdaq-trading-2020-6-1029325478 [perma.cc/P7MZ-67WG]
(showing that the two largest stock exchanges in the world are the New York Stock
Exchange and the NASDAQ, both of which are located in the United States).
136
ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 132, at 22.
137
See id. at 23.
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The financial markets in the United States are large and
complex.135 They are an important part of the economy; however, the financial markets do not alone constitute the economy. The financial markets are separate from both the “real”
economy where goods and services are made and sold and the
personal sector of the economy comprised of individuals and
households who make wages, buy things, and hopefully save
for the future.136 In a sense, the part of the financial markets
known as the capital markets stands between companies and
individuals, mobilizing the savings of individuals to fund business ventures so those businesses can provide jobs and products to individual participants in the economy.137
Ideally, this function of the capital markets should make
all individuals in the economy better off because the businesses funded by the markets produce goods, services, and
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138
See E. GORDON & K. NATARAJAN, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND SERVICES 3 (10th rev.
ed. 2016) (“It is the financial system which supplies the necessary financial inputs
for the production of goods and services which in turn promote the well-being and
standard of living of the people of a country.”); EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, GOVERNANCE OF
GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE LAW, THE ECONOMICS, THE POLITICS 4 (2012) (“The
financial system provides a large number of critical functions . . . which are
inextricably linked with the welfare of modern economies and day-to-day life.”).
139
See SHILLER, supra note 1, at 8–9.
140
Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN.
ECON. 187, 188 (2000) (“A fundamental job of the economy is to allocate capital
efficiently. To achieve this, capital is supposed to be invested in the sectors that
are expected to have high returns and be withdrawn from sectors with poor
prospects.”).
141
See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 132, at 22.
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jobs that can improve everyone’s standard of living.138 On top
of that, individuals can save for the future by investing in
stocks and bonds. If widespread benefits to individuals and
households were not the ultimate goal, it would be difficult or
impossible to make a normative argument in favor of capital
markets. Surely, we should not as a society actively support
markets if they only serve to multiply the benefits of a few.
Rather, capital markets are deemed important because of their
potential to spread prosperity broadly across the economy.139
Notwithstanding this broad, economy-wide goal of capital
markets, the functions of these markets are often described
more narrowly, with a focus on the efficient functioning of the
market itself, rather than on the “real” economy outside the
bounds of the capital markets. This narrower perspective often
focuses on the concept of efficient capital allocation. That is,
the idea that when there is money available in the economy to
be invested, we want it to be invested in something productive.140 Capital markets can facilitate efficient capital allocation by: (1) mobilizing capital from savers who have wealth
available to invest; (2) allowing those savers to choose among
possible projects in which to invest their savings; and (3) creating mechanisms to allow investors to monitor the performance
of the businesses in which they are invested or may invest.141
Monitoring allows investors to make informed decisions about
where to spend their money. The hope is that if the capital
markets succeed in doing these three things, available savings
will flow to productive business ventures.
The implicit assumption underlying these market-focused
goals is that if the capital markets achieve them, they will do a
better job of providing widespread benefits to the broader economy. That is, good businesses will be funded, resulting in innovation and job creation that benefit all or most participants
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in the economy. If and when this is true, efficient markets
become a means by which the ends of widespread economic
prosperity can be achieved. However, as will be discussed below, the relationship between efficient markets and widespread
prosperity is complicated by growing wealth inequality. Nonetheless, financial market regulation most often takes aim at
these narrower, intermediate goals of improving the capital
markets’ allocative efficiency.
2. Goals of Capital Market Regulation
The SEC is not the only entity whose regulatory reach impacts the capital markets. However, its mission reflects widely
acknowledged goals of financial and capital markets regulation.142 The latter two parts of the SEC’s mission—”maintaining fair, orderly and efficient capital markets” and “facilitating
capital formation”143—directly reflect the market-focused goals
discussed above. The first part of its mission, protecting investors, deviates from this focus on the market itself and acknowledges the potential vulnerabilities of individual investors.
However, regulations aimed at protecting investors are usually
really aimed at protecting investments, which limits the reach
of any such protection for those with scarce resources to invest.
Each of these regulatory goals is discussed in turn below.
a. Protecting the Markets
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142
See id. at 52; MARC LABONTE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44918, WHO REGULATES
WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 3–5 (2020),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44918.pdf [perma.cc/H964-HNKW]. There are a
number of other oft-cited goals, such as fraud prevention and consumer protection, but these are less relevant to the capital markets-focused analysis herein.
143
About the SEC, supra note 134.
144
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (“A market in which prices always ‘fully
reflect’ all available information is called ‘efficient.’”).
145
Id. (“In general terms, the ideal is a market in which prices provide accurate signals for resource allocation . . . .”).
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In the context of the capital markets, market efficiency (or,
price efficiency) refers to investors’ ability to accurately value a
particular company and its plans for using capital raised in the
markets.144 This ability of the market to determine the price of
a security is deemed a prerequisite for efficient capital
allocation.145
In the capital markets, the price of a security is determined
by the price investors are willing to pay for it. If investors have
access to information about a company, they can make a good
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estimation of what to pay for that company’s securities. This
will create demand among investors for the securities of valuable companies, pushing the prices of their securities up. Fewer
investors will want to buy the securities of less valuable companies, pushing the prices of those companies’ securities down. If
markets are efficient, investors are able to accurately decide
how much they are willing to pay for a security based on the
information they have. Because this will make the price of
valuable companies go up, it means more money will flow to
more valuable companies while less money flows to less valuable companies.146 In this way, we hope capital is allocated
efficiently; that is, we hope that our capital markets fund promising, quality-of-life-enhancing businesses and innovations.147
When regulation focuses on market efficiency, it is attempting to protect the functioning of the market, which
should serve as a means to achieve the ultimate goal of widespread prosperity. Rules aimed at improving market efficiency
seek to ensure that investors can monitor company performance and make informed decisions about what to pay for financial assets, as well as ensure that money flows to the correct
companies and the markets are liquid. A great deal of marketfocused regulation is directed at ensuring that investors have
the information they need to set this capital allocation mechanism in motion.148 Indeed, some scholars argue that this is the
only desirable function of capital market regulation.149 A regulatory focus on maximizing market efficiency implies a belief
that if the financial markets function well, they will provide
greater benefits to the broader economy.
43781-crn_107-3 Sheet No. 93 Side B

b. Protecting Investors
Investor protection was a fundamental motivation for
adopting the securities law framework that governs many aspects of the U.S. capital markets today.150 When regulation
focuses on investor protection, it strays somewhat from a
straightforward focus on ensuring that the market is function-
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146
See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 721 (2006).
147
Once a company has raised money, and its securities are trading only in
the secondary market, market efficiency can serve to facilitate trading and allow
investors to monitor company managers. See id.; Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws
and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1013 (1992).
148
See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 132, at 62.
149
See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 146, at 713.
150
See Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (1983).
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ing efficiently and instead considers whether the individuals
participating in the market are treated fairly.151 Investor protection is not unrelated to optimizing market functioning. If
there were no rules to protect investors, they might not invest
their money, and then there would be less capital to allocate.152
However, investor protection is also motivated by a desire to
protect the investors’ investments by reducing the likelihood
that they are exploited when participating in the markets.153
This is particularly true when the investors are deemed to be
unsophisticated or of limited financial means.
Investor-protective regulation relies heavily on disclosure
as a regulatory tool.154 The idea underlying this strategy is to
ensure that investors have all the information they need to
evaluate and understand their investments. In this way, this
type of regulation aims to ensure that participants in the market do not take on risks they do not understand. To improve
the reliability of these disclosures, the U.S. capital markets
regulatory regime also provides for public and private enforcement when disclosure is false or misleading.155 Another tool of
investor-protective regulation is placing legal duties on those
who provide advice to investors and threatening liability to
those who lead investors astray.156 These regulatory strategies
seek to ensure investors understand the risks they are taking
to prevent vulnerable investors from unwittingly losing their
investments. Thus, this type of investor protective regulation is
primarily directed at investors who have limited knowledge of
or familiarity with the capital markets. This more often describes ordinary investors than wealthy ones. With less
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See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 132, at 55.
Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Public Statement by
Commissioner: Investor Protection is Needed for True Capital Formation: Views
on the JOBS Act (Mar. 16, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/
2012-spch031612laahtm [perma.cc/6GNX-QBLD] (“True capital formation and
economic growth require investors to have both confidence in the capital markets
and access to the information needed to make good investment decisions.”).
153
See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 132, at 55.
154
Id. at 62.
155
See Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2021); Securities Act
of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
156
See Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 736–39 (2010) (discussing the history of debate on
the fiduciary duties of investment advisers); see also Robert J. Jackson Jr.,
Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Final Rules Governing Investment Advice (June 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-jackson-060519-iabd [perma.cc/WPY8-6YMU] (discussing the SEC’s most
recent rulemaking with respect to the fiduciary duties of investment advisers).
152
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B. Case Study: Retirement Savings and Short Selling

157

See supra section I.B.3.
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Wealthy American households and ordinary American
households participate in the financial markets in very different ways. These differences in investment portfolios create differences in returns on investment, which accelerate the growth
of economic inequality in the United States.157 This Article
begins to explore the role financial regulation plays in advancing these troubling trends. To do so, it examines the regulation
of two specific financial practices: retirement savings and short

43781-crn_107-3 Sheet No. 94 Side B

wealth, ordinary investors have less experience investing, and
they lack the means to pay for specialized investment advice.
In a way, a regulatory focus on protecting unsophisticated
investors’ investments relates to the distribution of wealth.
Given the little wealth that most Americans have to invest in
the capital markets, and the centrality of savings to economic
security, effective investor protection reduces the likelihood
that investors of modest means lose what wealth they do have.
If we think that absent investor protection the wealthy would
more often exploit the less wealthy, investor protection may
even be mildly redistributive in that it prevents one potential
flow of wealth from the less wealthy to the wealthier. However,
as will be discussed in more detail below, the extent of this
distributive function is limited because it does not protect ordinary investors from market and regulatory structures that
maintain and grow the wealth divide.
The motivations of protecting investors and protecting
markets are not entirely distinct concepts. If investors stood a
substantial chance of being exploited in the capital markets,
fewer people would invest. A lack of capital is not good for the
markets. Similarly, investors benefit from the opportunity to
participate in liquid, efficient and well-functioning markets.
Investing in securities would be a much riskier proposition if
investors were not confident that they could easily sell them
when they wanted to, or that the price they paid reflected the
value of the security. So, the line between these two categories
of regulatory motivations is penetrable.
The following section describes two financial practices that
are not equally available to wealthy and ordinary investors:
retirement saving and short selling stock. The subsequent sections will explore how the regulatory priorities described above
are applied to each practice.
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selling. This pair of financial practices is but one of many
examples of the divide between the financial wealth of the
wealthy and that of ordinary Americans.158 A close examination of any such practice would likely illuminate the relationship between financial regulation and inequality. This Article
takes a first step into this inquiry by focusing on short selling
and retirement savings because they provide a unique example
of where the financial wealth of ordinary Americans and that of
wealthy Americans intersect.
1. Retirement Savings
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158
An underinclusive list of financial practices that are disproportionately
available to wealthy investors includes: private equity, venture capital, and any
number of hedge funds. See SEC, Updated Investor Bulletin, supra note 105.
159
BROWN, SAAD-LESSLER & OAKLEY, supra note 83, at 2, 4. Approximately onethird of American households have non-employee-sponsored individual retirement accounts. However, these households overwhelmingly also have employeesponsored defined contribution or defined benefit savings. They are also wealthier than the households without IRAs. Thus, employee-sponsored retirement savings remain the first line of defense (after social security) for retirement security
for most American households. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2011, at 360 tbls.552 & 553 (2011), https://www2.census.gov/
library/publications/2010/compendia/statab/130ed/tables/11s0552.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S74V-R37M].
160
PATRICK PURCELL & JENNIFER STAMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34443, SUMMARY
OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (ERISA) 3 (2009).
161
Id.
162
Id.
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As discussed above, retirement saving is the primary avenue through which middle class Americans invest in the financial markets. Employer-sponsored retirement plans are the
most important means for providing income for retired Americans given that social security benefits only replace 35% of a
household’s pre-retirement income.159
There are two primary categories of employer-sponsored
retirement plans: defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans. Defined benefit plans are the types of retirement
plans most often referred to as “pensions.” Employers offering
defined benefit plans pay their retired employees a predetermined payment while the former employee is retired.160 Because the amount of the payments is guaranteed, employers
are the investors for these plans and the employers therefore
bear the investment risk.161 The employer sets aside funds to
make pension payments, invests that money, and is responsible for making up the difference if available funds are inadequate to make all promised pension payments.162 While
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widespread before the 1980s, defined benefit plans have been
declining in number since then.163
Today, the most prevalent type of employer-sponsored retirement plan is a defined contribution plan.164 A defined contribution plan provides an individual account for each
participating employee. Employers that choose to provide this
type of plan will offer some portion of their employees the right
to participate in a defined contribution retirement plan.165
(These plans are often colloquially referred to as 401(k) plans in
reference to the section of the tax code that grants many defined contribution plans special tax status.166) If the employee
chooses to participate, she will contribute a portion of her salary to the plan, and in some cases the employer may provide
additional contributions. The employee then has a menu of
options for where she can invest the money.167 Generally, the
options consist of a limited variety of mutual funds invested in
bonds and equity.168 The benefits available to be paid out at
retirement are a function of the amount of money contributed
to the account and any investment gains or losses on the balance in the account. So, for defined contribution plans, the
individual employees are the investors, and they bear the risk
of loss.169
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163
Id. at 3–4. Several reasons are cited for the increasing popularity of defined
contribution plans and the declining popularity of defined benefit plans: (1) global
competition makes companies more cost-conscious; (2) a mobile work force prefers the portability of defined contribution plans; (3) ERISA funding requirements
made defined benefit plans more expensive; (4) I.R.C. § 401(k) made defined contribution plans more appealing. Id. at 4.
164
In 2018, 46,869 employer-sponsored retirement plans were defined benefit
and 675,007 were defined contribution. EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN HISTORICAL TABLES AND GRAPHS 1975–2018, at 1 tbl.E1
(Jan. 2021), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ebsa/researchers/statistics/retirement-bulletins/private-pension-plan-bulletin-historical-tables-andgraphs.pdf [https://perma.cc/NYR5-9GMB].
165
See Matt Bell, 9 Steps to Make the Most of Your 401(k), SOUND MIND INVESTING (March 26, 2021), https://soundmindinvesting.com/articles/view/9-stepsto-make-the-most-of-your-401k [https://perma.cc/8UUS-UVWV] (observing that
only 27% of workers eligible for a 401(k) participate).
166
See I.R.C. § 401(k).
167
Sometimes the employer will match a portion of that contribution. See
Bell, supra note 165.
168
JACK VANDERHEI, SARAH HOLDEN, LUIS ALONSO & STTEVEN BASS, EMP. BENEFIT
RSCH. INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 436, 401(K) PLAN ASSET ALLOCATION, ACCOUNT BALANCES,
AND LOAN ACTIVITY IN 2015, at 24 fig.22 (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.ebri.org/docs/
default-source/ebri-issue-brief/ebri_ib_436_k-update.pdf?sfvrsn=7187292f_0
[https://perma.cc/38CA-3KWT] (showing that most 401(k) plans consist only of
“equity, bond, money and/or balanced funds,” with a minority of plans providing
additional options); Bell, supra note 165 (noting that the average 401(k) plan
offers 15 investment choices).
169
PURCELL & STAMAN, supra note 160, at 3.
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The mutual funds available in defined contribution retirement plans are created and managed by an outside investment
manager with which the employer contracts. These outside
investment managers are in the business of pooling the invested money of many individuals.170 As defined contribution
accounts have increased in popularity, large investment managers that provide the funds in which retirement savers invest
have grown in prominence.171 These companies, such as
BlackRock, Vanguard, Fidelity and State Street, manage trillions of dollars of Americans’ retirement savings, which are
invested through mutual funds, largely in stocks and bonds.172
As will be discussed below, these large pools of retirement savings are an important resource for short sellers.
2. Short Selling
Short selling stock is a practice by which an investor can
make money on a company’s failure rather than its success.
Generally, an investor will short a company’s stock if they think
the price of that stock is going to fall in the future.173 While
short selling may be relatively unfamiliar to the average retirement saver, short sellers hold billions of dollars of short positions on any given day.174
The mechanics of short selling involve selling a share of
stock that the investor does not actually own.175 To do this, a
short seller must find someone willing to lend their shares. The
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170
See Emily Winston, Managerial Fixation and the Limitations of Shareholder
Oversight, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 717 (2020).
171
See id. at 717–18.
172
See BlackRock, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6 (Feb. 28, 2020)
(“BlackRock is among the world’s largest managers of pension plan assets with
$2.6 trillion, or 67%, of long-term institutional AUM managed for defined benefit,
defined contribution and other pension plans for corporations, governments and
unions at December 31, 2019.”); About Fidelity, FIDELITY INVS., https://
www.fidelity.com/about-fidelity/our-company [https://perma.cc/3VN9-8X5K]
(last visited Feb. 22, 2021) (stating that Fidelity manages employee benefit programs for over 22,000 businesses and holds $10.4 trillion in customer assets).
173
Joshua Kennon, The Basics of Shorting Stock: A Beginner’s Guide for How
to Short Stocks, THE BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/the-basics-of-shorting-stock-356327 [https://perma.cc/9F5M-3QV5] (last updated May 13, 2021)
(“Short stock trades occur because sellers believe a stock’s price is headed
downward.”).
174
See, e.g., Largest Short Interest Positions on 6/30/2020, MARKETBEAT
https://www.marketbeat.com/short-interest/ [https://perma.cc/YM79-UGED]
(last visited July 22, 2020) (showing close to $100 billion in short positions on
June 30, 2020).
175
FRANÇOIS-SERGE LHABITANT, HANDBOOK OF HEDGE FUNDS 126–127 (2006). The
author describes a direct method for shorting stock. Id. Investors can achieve a
similar financial result using futures or options contracts—processes known as
“synthetic shorts.” Although those practices are not the topic of this Article, the
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short seller pays a willing lender a fee to borrow shares of stock
and agrees to return them at some future date.176 The short
seller then sells the borrowed shares of stock and buys them
back at the end of the loan period.177 If, as the short seller
hopes, the price of the stock goes down, they are able to buy the
shares back at a lower price than the price at which they had
sold them. The difference between the high price at which they
sold the shares and the low price at which they bought them
back (less the lending fee) is the short seller’s profit from this
transaction.178
There are a number of ways to invest in short selling. Most
prominently, hedge funds engage in short selling.179 Some,
known as short-only funds, do so as their primary investment
strategy. These funds will actively seek out companies that
they believe are overvalued and short their stock in an attempt
to profit from the eventual fall in price.180 Other hedge funds
use short selling as part of a more complex investment strategy.181 As discussed above, ordinary Americans are excluded
from investing in hedge funds due to lack of access and the
accredited investor standard.182 However, there are opportunities to invest in short selling for those who do not meet the
requirements to be an accredited investor.
A special category of mutual funds, called liquid alternative
funds, engage in many financial practices that are usually the
province of hedge funds, including short selling.183 These al-
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way in which the availability of synthetic shorts affects short selling regulation is
discussed in section III.D infra.
176
LHABITANT, supra note 175, at 127.
177
Id.
178
Kennon, supra note 173.
179
Molk & Partnoy, supra note 114, at 846.
180
See, e.g., Short Only, TRADEWIND CAP., http://tradewindcapital.eu/index.php/shareclasses/ [https://perma.cc/3FG9-CJUU] (last visited Feb. 22,
2021) (“Stocks are selected on the basis of expected poor relative or negative
returns . . . .”).
181
See Eric Bank, Hedge Fund Strategies (Part 5)—Hedged Equity Short Selling, ERIC BANK BLOG (Apr. 24, 2011), https://ericbank.com/hedge-fund-strategies-part-5-hedged-equity-short-selling/ [https://perma.cc/V7C6-Y6YM]
(discussing the different hedging strategies involving short selling that hedge
funds employ).
182
See supra section I.B.3.
183
See Anita K. Krug, Investors’ Paradox, 43 J. CORP. L. 245, 247 (2018)
(describing a liquid alternative fund as “a mutual fund that pursues investment
and trading strategies that are similar in many respects to the types of strategies
pursued by hedge funds, private equity funds, and other types of privately-offered
funds”) (footnotes omitted); id. at 262 (stating that liquid alternative funds can
short securities); see also ProShares UltraShort Consumer Services, PROSHARES,
https://www.proshares.com/funds/scc_index.html [https://perma.cc/3MK6J8UW] (describing an exchange traded fund that invests in short positions).
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ternative funds are structured to meet the legal requirements
to be available to all investors, regardless of whether they meet
the accredited investor standard.184 Thus, there are no regulatory barriers to ordinary investors participating in short selling
via liquid alternative funds. However, these funds will rarely be
among the limited investment options available in an employersponsored retirement plan.185 So, in most cases, investors
would need to be investing money other than their retirement
savings to participate in these funds and, as was discussed
above, very few ordinary Americans have adequate savings to
invest in financial assets other than through their retirement
accounts.186
Finally, ordinary Americans can, in theory, participate in
short selling individually. One need not be an accredited investor to do so because short selling is not technically an investment. It is a trading strategy that can be applied to publicly
traded securities. An individual wishing to sell securities short
must employ a broker that can lend her shares. A number of
popular online brokers facilitate short selling for ordinary
investors.187
Notwithstanding the lack of an accredited investor requirement to short sell, it is unlikely that many ordinary Americans
participate in this practice. The constraints of lack of wealth
and lack of access to intermediaries create a barrier for many
ordinary Americans.
Because short selling securities requires borrowing the securities before selling them short, investors must open margin
accounts to engage in short selling.188 Federal regulations re-
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Krug, supra note 183, at 251.
Id. at 276–78 (noting that the lack of advice available to investors when
making retirement account investment decisions will inhibit investors’ ability to
effectively utilize opportunities to invest in liquid alternative funds). In addition to
this lack of advice, fiduciary obligations placed on retirement plan managers may
make it unlikely that plan managers will make these alternative funds available to
investors in a given employer-sponsored plan. See infra subpart II.C.
186
See supra section I.B.1.
187
See Trading FAQs: Order Types, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/trading/faqs-order-types [https://perma.cc/YW2R-YSRV] (last visited Feb. 22, 2021);
Peter Klink, Shorting a Stock: Seeking the Upside of Downside Markets, TD AMERITRADE: THE TICKER TAPE (Oct. 15, 2019), https://tickertape.tdameritrade.com/
trading/short-selling-basics-shorting-a-stock-17047 [https://perma.cc/3V7GHUNP]; Short Selling Explained: Trading Strategies, ALLY FIN. INC. (Mar. 1, 2017),
https://www.ally.com/do-it-right/investing/short-selling-explained-tradingstrategies/ [https://perma.cc/HED8-CCWT].
188
See, e.g.,Margin Investing: A Guide for Vanguard Brokerage Clients, VANGUARD 13 (2019), http://vanguard.com/pdf/margin.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7DQA-2GSS] (describing how an investor must be approved for a margin account
before engaging in short selling).
185
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quire that a margin account have a minimum balance of
$2,000189 and that the balance must always equal 150% of the
current value of the shorted securities.190 So, short selling,
even small amounts, requires an investor to have a minimum
of $2000 cash on hand, plus more if the price of the stock rises
before they close out their short position. Even if a nonwealthy investor had adequate cash on hand and found her
way to a brokerage firm, she may not be sufficiently familiar
with short selling to inquire about the practice.191
These days, it is not difficult for ordinary investors to find
their way to online brokers. Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic
led to a surge of interest in stock trading among ordinary Americans.192 However, recent events appear to confirm that short
selling remains a practice reserved for wealthy investors. In
January 2021, a populist uprising among ordinary retail investors caused a sudden spike in the stock price of the ailing
retailer GameStop.193 The investors driving the unprecedented
rally in GameStop stock were inspired by a desire to cause
financial losses for short-selling hedge funds.194
The exclusion of many ordinary investors from short selling
may not be a bad outcome, given the enormous risk involved.
When you purchase a share of stock, your potential losses are
limited to the price you paid for the share. When you short a
share of stock, your losses have no limit because there is no
theoretical limit to how high the price of the stock could go once
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189
FINRA Manual, Rule 4210(b) (2021) https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/4210 [https://perma.cc/9ZLM-CB77].
190
12 C.F.R. § 220.12(c) (2020).
191
See infra note 293.
192
See Stephanie Yang, The Pandemic Turned My Parents into Day Traders,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-pandemic-turnedmy-parents-into-day-traders-11603488582 [https://perma.cc/LWV9-HCVH]
(“The ranks of amateur day traders have swollen this year, helping to create a
record number of new accounts at brokerages like Charles Schwab and TD Ameritrade.”); Sydney Ember, The Boredom Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/20/business/gamestop-investing-economy.html [https://perma.cc/P65F-LBK4] (“Investing as a way of coping with pandemic boredom has also fueled an amateur day-trading boom more broadly. New
accounts at online brokers like E-Trade, Charles Schwab, and Robinhood
exploded.”).
193
See Tory Newmyer, Douglas MacMillan, and Hamza Shaban, Congress
Presses Robinhood CEO on Company’s Role in GameStop Stock Frenzy, WASH. POST
(Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/02/18/
gamestop-robinhood-citadel-roaring-kitty-hearing-live-updates/ [https://
perma.cc/42B7-GRNF].
194
Matt Phillips & Taylor Lorenz, ‘Dumb Money’ Is on GameStop, and It’s
Beating Wall Street at its Own Game, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/01/27/business/gamestop-wall-street-bets.html
[https://perma.cc/3HPN-RBDE].
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you have borrowed it and sold it short.195 If the price of the
stock rises instead of falling, the investor must pay the new,
higher price to buy back the shares when the lending period is
over. If the price rises a lot, the investor can lose a lot, as did a
couple of hedge funds that were shorting GameStop in January
2021.196 Any such extraordinary losses would be difficult or
impossible for most Americans to bear.
3. Connection
This Article uses short selling as a case study because it is
a financial practice disproportionately available to the wealthy
that bears an important connection to the retirement savings of
ordinary Americans. Large-scale short selling would be much
more difficult without the retirement savings of ordinary Americans. Defined contribution retirement savings are among the
biggest sources of shares for lending to short sellers.197
As was discussed above, large investment managers such
as BlackRock, State Street, Fidelity, and Vanguard hold large
quantities of shares for defined contribution retirement savers.
Retirement savings are invested for the long term198 and are
often invested in index funds, which do not engage in active
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195
A simplified example: If you buy a share of stock for $50 and the company
loses 100% of its value, you lose $50. If you short a stock that is currently trading
at $50, you borrow the share and then sell it for $50. You now have $50 of cash.
You shorted the stock because you thought the price would go down, but it might
instead go up. If the price of the stock goes up, and it is trading at $200 on the
day you need to return your borrowed share, you now have to pay that $200 in
order to be able to return your borrowed share. You have now lost $150 (the $200
you paid for the share less the $50 you made when you sold it). In this way, losses
from short selling can far exceed losses from purchasing a share of stock. In
addition, a real-life transaction would involve a lending fee, and the share lender
would likely require collateral to ensure the share is returned.
196
Juliet Chung, Melvin Capital Lost 53% in January, Hurt by GameStop and
Other Bets, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/melvincapital-lost-53-in-january-hurt-by-gamestop-and-other-bets-11612103117
[https://perma.cc/88P2-LC7H].
197
Viktoria Baklanova, Cecilia Caglio, Frank Keane &&Burt Porter, A Pilot
Survey of Agent Securities Lending Activity, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 7 tbl.3
(Aug. 2016), https://www.sec.gov/files/Porter_PilotSurveyAgentSecuritiesLend
ingActivity.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DFK-UBFE] (showing that the group titled
“Pension Funds and Endowments” was the largest lender of securities during the
studied period in 2015).
198
LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 123 (2012) (“[M]ost stocks
are held either by individuals with long-term investing goals (like saving for retirement . . . ), or by institutions like pension funds and mutual funds that run
portfolios on behalf of these individuals.”).
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trading.199 Thus, retirement account shares that are managed
by investment managers are often available for lending.200
And, indeed, investment managers do lend out these shares.
In fact, it is an important aspect of their business model. For
example, at the end of 2019, BlackRock had $290 billion of
loaned securities outstanding.201
Investment managers charge fees for lending shares, and
these fees constitute revenues for the investment manager. For
example, in 2019, BlackRock reported $617 million in revenue
from its securities lending practices.202 The income from those
fees can be passed on to the retirement savers whose shares
were lent. The extent to which this revenue is passed on to the
saver varies among investment managers, but the percentage
that is passed on is almost always over 50% and sometimes
close to 100%.203 When investment managers pass these fees
on to retirement savers, it increases the retirement savers’ savings, either by reducing the fees the savers pay to the investment managers or by increasing the balance in their retirement
accounts.
Thus, these two financial practices, while very different,
are intertwined and mutually beneficial. Short sellers rely on
the existence of concentrated pools of retirement savings to
provide a supply of shares available for lending. Retirement
savers, in turn, can save a bit more if they share in the benefit
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199
Dawn Lim, Index Funds Are the New Kings of Wall Street, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-funds-are-the-new-kingsof-wall-street-11568799004 [https://perma.cc/3CQY-FZKG].
200
Baklanova, Caglio, Keane & Porter, supra note 197, at 7 tbl.2 (showing that
“Pension Funds and Endowments” had $2.5 trillion of securities available for
lending during the studied period in 2015).
201
BlackRock, Inc., supra note 172, at 10; see also State Street Corp., Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at 123 (Dec. 31, 2020) (“The aggregate amount of indemnified
securities on loan totaled $440.88 billion . . . as of December 31, 2020 . . . .”).
202
BlackRock, Inc., supra note 172, at 46; see also State Street Corp., supra
note 201, at 128 (showing $356 million in revenue from securities finance for the
fiscal year ending December 31, 2020). Note, however, that BlackRock’s $617
million in revenue from share lending represents only 4% of their $14.5 billion in
total revenue reported in 2019. BlackRock, Inc., supra note 172, at 32, 46.
BlackRock’s revenue from share lending represents a much, much smaller percentage of the $7.4 trillion in assets that BlackRock was managing at the end of
2019. Id. at 2.
203
Adam McCullough, Our Take on Why Securities-Lending Risk is Overblown,
MORNINGSTAR (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.morningstar.com/insights/2019/01/
17/securities-lending [https://perma.cc/6QMC-WU7R] (showing that all studied
investment managers pass substantial percentages of their lending fees on to the
investors in the funds they manage, that, in particular, Vanguard passes over
90% of the fees onto the investors in its funds, and that BlackRock passes between 69% and 78%, depending on the type of security).
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from lending fees.204 As is discussed further below, this mutual benefit combined with the distinct regulatory approaches
applied to these two practices gives the outward appearance
that only good comes from these interrelated practices. However, a closer look illuminates how these two practices and
their regulation contribute to the growth of wealth inequality.
The remainder of this Part explores the motivations behind
the regulation of both retirement savings and short selling.
Part III will explore how these regulatory motivations can contribute to the capital markets’ role in accelerating wealth
inequality.
C. Regulation of Retirement Accounts: Protecting Investors
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However, the additional savings are very minimal. See infra section III.A.2.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001–1461 (2021).
206
ERISA also covers private sector defined benefit plans, see PURCELL &
STAMAN, supra note 160, at 3–4, but these plans are not the subject of this paper
for the reasons described in section II.B.1 supra.
207
About Us, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol
[https://perma.cc/HTP5-AHWM] (last visited July 3, 2021) (stating that the
DOL’s mission is “[t]o foster, promote, and develop the welfare of the wage earners,
job seekers, and retirees of the United States; improve working conditions; advance opportunities for profitable employment; and assure work-related benefits
and rights”).
208
PURCELL & STAMAN, supra note 160, at 2.
209
Id.
205
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The primary source of law governing retirement savings in
the United States is the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).205 As the title of this law suggests, it
focuses on protecting the investments of retirement savers.
Specifically, ERISA protects savers in private-sector employee
benefit plans, including the defined contribution retirement
plans discussed herein.206 Because of its connection to the
employer-employee relationship, ERISA is largely enforced by
the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”). The DOL is, of
course, guided by a different mission than the SEC. However,
in the context of retirement savings, the DOL’s mission to “promote . . . the welfare of wage earners . . . and retirees” aligns
with the SEC’s regulatory goal of protecting investors.207
ERISA was passed in response to employee losses from
poorly managed pension accounts in the 1950s and 1960s.208
As employer-sponsored retirement plans grew in popularity in
the mid-twentieth century, instances of mismanagement also
grew.209 When employers mismanaged retirement accounts,
employees found themselves empty-handed upon retire-
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ment.210 Consequently, Congress adopted ERISA in 1974. ERISA utilizes an array of tools in its effort to protect employee
retirement savers who participate in employer-sponsored retirement plans (“plan participants”).211 This discussion focuses on the aspects of the law that implicate plan participants’
interaction with the capital markets.
A primary regulatory tool of ERISA, as is common when
unsophisticated investors are potentially involved, is disclosure.212 The statute attempts to protect the interests of plan
participants by requiring several types of disclosure, including
a plain language description of how the retirement plan
works213 and periodic statements of the saver’s balances and
rights under the plan.214 These are measures designed to increase savers’ understanding of their investments and related
risks.
ERISA also places fiduciary responsibilities on those who
are responsible for the management and operation of retirement plans.215 The employer adopting the plan must name at
least one person to serve as a fiduciary and manage the retirement plan.216 But anyone who, in practice, exercises control or
authority over the plan is also deemed a fiduciary under the
law.217 These fiduciary responsibilities include a duty of loyalty, which is a duty to discharge the fiduciary’s responsibilities
in the interest of and for the exclusive purpose of providing
benefits to plan participants.218 Part of the duty of loyalty includes defraying the reasonable expenses of administering the
plan, which includes assessing the reasonableness of any fees
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210
Id. (“After the Studebaker automobile company terminated its underfunded pension plan in 1963, leaving several thousand workers and retirees
without the pensions that they had been promised, Congress began considering
legislation to ensure the security of pension benefits in the private sector.”).
211
For a complete summary of the many employee protections contained in
ERISA, see id. at 6–57.
212
See id. at 7–10.
213
29 U.S.C. §§ 1021(a)(1), 1022(a) (requiring that participants be furnished
with a “summary plan . . . written in a manner calculated to be understood by the
average plan participant”); Richard J. Link, Annotation, What Documents Constitute “Summary Plan Descriptions” Under Employment Retirement Income Security
Act (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 et seq.), 124 A.L.R. Fed. 355 (1995) (“Employers who set
up employee-benefit plans governed by [ERISA] . . . are required to provide each
participant in the plan with a summary plan description . . . in plain
language . . . .”).
214
29 U.S.C. § 1025(1)(a) (requiring that the administrator of a plan regularly
provide participants with a “pension benefit statement”).
215
See PURCELL & STAMAN, supra note 160, at 24–32.
216
29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
217
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
218
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
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charged in investing the plan assets.219 This makes funds that
engage in share lending to short sellers more attractive because
the lending fees lower the cost of investing.
Fiduciaries are also required to act with prudence in managing the plan assets, meaning that the plan manager must
take steps to ensure she is acting with care and not subjecting
savers to unnecessary risks.220 The prudence requirement
may lead plan managers to exclude from the plan funds that
use risky investment strategies, such as short selling. Plan
managers are also statutorily required to diversify the plan
assets across investments.221 This generally means that “fiduciaries should not invest an unreasonably large proportion of a
plan’s portfolio in a single security, in a single type of security,
or in various securities dependent upon the success of a single
enterprise or upon conditions in a single locality.”222 As a consequence of these fiduciary rules, plan managers mostly select
pooled, diversified investment funds, and in turn that is where
retirement savers invest their savings.223 So, ERISA not only
protects retirement investors by requiring disclosure so that
savers can understand what they are investing in, but also by
imposing fiduciary duties to reduce the baseline risk for all
plan participants. Some protection is built in even if savers do
not read or understand the disclosure.224 One result of this
investor-protective framework is that retirement savings are
funneled into mutual funds that can be sources of share lending for short sellers.
R
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PURCELL & STAMAN, supra note 160, at 25.
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B); see Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1232
(9th Cir. 1983) (discussing the prudent person test) (“[A]t the time they engaged in
the challenged transactions, [the fiduciaries] employed the appropriate methods
to investigate the merits of the investment and to structure the investment.”).
221
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
222
PURCELL & STAMAN, supra note 160, at 26.
223
See DELOITTE, THE RETIREMENT LANDSCAPE HAS CHANGED—ARE PLAN SPONSORS
READY?: 2019 DEFINED CONTRIBUTION BENCHMARKING SURVEY REPORT 16 (2019),
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/human-capital/articles/annual-defined-contribution-benchmarking-survey.html [https://perma.cc/9GXA-64N8]
(listing the “top 10 investment option offerings,” many of which include pooled,
diversified investment funds); see also BRIGHTSCOPE & INV. CO. INST., THE BRIGHTSCOPE/ICI DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN PROFILE: A CLOSE LOOK AT 401(k) PLANS,
2017, at 37 (Aug. 2020), https://www.ici.org/pdf/20_ppr_dcplan_profile_401k.
pdf [https://perma.cc/ZS34-TXLN] (showing that equity and bond funds are the
most common investment options in 401(k) plans).
224
See Intel Corp. Inv. Pol’y Comm. v. Sulyma, 140 S. Ct. 768, 773 (2020)
(acknowledging that plan participants do not always read their disclosures by
declining to find “actual knowledge” by the plaintiff employee at the time he
received disclosure).
220
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225
PURCELL & STAMAN, supra note 160, at 1. However, the Internal Revenue
Service grants tax deductions and deferrals to encourage employers to provide
retirement plans for their employees. Id.
226
See sources cited supra note 87.
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The regulation of private retirement savings in the United
States—the most commonly-held financial assets among ordinary Americans—falls squarely within the “investor protection”
category of financial regulations. And, as discussed above, this
can affect the distribution of wealth. If ERISA’s protections
keep retirement savers from losing their retirement savings,
that has a distributional impact in that it keeps the saver from
losing their share of the national wealth. That said, the distributional impact of this investor-protective regulation is limited
in a number of ways.
First, ERISA does not require that every employer provide
any type of benefit plan to its employees.225 If it did, of course,
we would not have approximately 50% of working age Americans without retirement savings.226 Rather, ERISA requires
that if an employer chooses to provide a retirement plan for its
employees, it must also comply with ERISA in its administration of the plan. This protective regulation does very little to
remedy the fact that most Americans have inadequate retirement savings. And the protections do not reach Americans
who lack retirement savings. This is a recurring limitation of
any financial regulation, a limitation that is considered again in
subpart III.D below.
Second, this investor-protective regulation does not change
the fact that earning a return on retirement savings does not
create more disposable wealth today. It does not increase the
standard of living of the saver. It is not intended to be passed
on to heirs and secure family wealth across generations. It is,
instead, intended to help the saver maintain their standard of
living in retirement.
Finally, this investor-protective regulation does not reduce
the disparity in rate of return earned by ordinary versus
wealthy investors. In fact, it probably has the opposite effect,
for two reasons. First, it creates opportunities for wealthy investors to earn higher average returns by making shares available for short selling. Second, it lowers the risk to which
retirement investors are exposed thereby lowering their rate of
return. In financial markets, taking on less risk usually means
accepting a lower rate of return. That is not to say that reducing the risk to which retirement savers are exposed is bad
policy. It is not. Investors with minimal wealth usually should
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not be exposed to a substantial risk that they will lose that
limited wealth, at least not unknowingly. But, protecting retirement investors from risky investments will, inevitably, usually have the effect of lowering their average rate of return.
The investor-protective regulation of retirement savings is
grounded in a highly defensible policy goal. Nonetheless, its
capacity to reduce economic inequality by helping ordinary
Americans accumulate wealth is substantially limited.
D. Regulation of Short Selling: Protecting (and Expanding)
Markets
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227
See supra note 187 (describing the possibility of significant loss from short
selling).
228
Non-accredited investors can still engage in short selling through liquid
alternative funds or as retail investors. See supra section II.B.2. Investors in
liquid alternative funds are beneficiaries of certain investor protective regulations.
See Krug, supra note 184, at 247 (describing the regulatory constraints on liquid
alternative funds).
229
See Douglas M. Branson, Nibbling at the Edges—Regulation of Short Selling: Policing Fails to Deliver and Restoration of an Uptick Rule, 65 BUS. LAW. 67,
69–72 (2009).
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An important starting point for a discussion of the regulation of short selling is the application of the accredited investor
standard. As discussed in section I.B.3 above, the accredited
investor standard creates a regulatory barrier between ordinary investors and the most prominent vehicle for engaging in
short selling—hedge funds. The accredited investor standard
and its application to short selling aims to protect investors. As
was mentioned above, short selling is an extremely risky financial practice because an investor engaging in short selling can
potentially lose much more than what they invest in the transaction.227 Thus, the partial application of the accredited investor standard to short-selling hedge funds serves to shield many
ordinary investors from exposure to this risk.228
Once past the accredited investor hurdle, the regulation of
short selling is largely directed at protecting the markets. The
line demarcating when short selling is and is not permissible
has shifted over the years, and debates around where that line
should be drawn have focused on how short selling affects the
health of the capital markets. Specifically, these debates have
focused on maximizing short selling’s contributions to market
efficiency and liquidity while minimizing its contributions to
market volatility and manipulation.229

43781-crn_107-3 Sheet No. 101 Side B

06/09/2022 09:20:03

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\107-3\CRN303.txt

826

unknown

Seq: 46

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

4-JUN-22

13:52

[Vol. 107:781

With the exception of one brief period in 2008,230 short
selling has never been banned outright in the United States
because of its perceived—and empirically documented—contribution to market efficiency.231 Short sellers who primarily engage in short selling as an investment strategy will attempt to
find overvalued companies with problems that the rest of the
market has not yet identified. This is how these short sellers
make money. The market has priced the securities too high
because it does not yet know about the problems. Once the
market becomes aware of the problems, the price falls, and the
short seller profits. If, in seeking these profits, short sellers do
uncover previously unknown information about a company,
this new information benefits the entire market because it
makes the prices of assets in the market more accurate.232
A well-documented example is the short seller Fahmi
Quadir’s bet against the pharmaceutical company Valeant in
2015.233 Valeant was engaged in a complex scheme of corruption and fraud when Quadir shorted its stock in 2015.234 At
the time she executed the transaction, Valeant’s stock was
trading at around $257 per share.235 As its fraud was exposed,
the stock price fell to $28 eight months later.236 The fund for
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230
SEC Halts Short Selling of Financial Stocks to Protect Investors and Markets,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 19, 2008) https://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2008/2008-211.htm [https://perma.cc/SHC4-KW6P].
231
See, e.g., Pedro A.C. Saffi & Kari Sigurdsson, Price Efficiency and Short
Selling, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 821, 823–24 (2010) (showing that when stocks are not
available to lend out for short sellers, price efficiency is negatively impacted);
Ekkehart Boehmer & Juan (Julie) Wu, Short Selling and the Price Discovery Process, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 287, 287 (2013) (“We show that stock prices are more
accurate when short sellers are more active.”); Gregory J. Clinch, Wei Li & Yunyan
Zhang, Short Selling and Firms’ Disclosure of Bad News: Evidence from Regulation
SHO, 4 J. FIN. REPORTING 1, 1 (2019) (“As informed traders, short sellers enhance
the informativeness of stock prices . . . .”); Amiyatosh Purnanandam & H. Nejat
Seyhun, Do Short Sellers Trade on Private Information or False Information?, 53 J.
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 997, 997 (2018) (“We find that shortselling activities
are considerably informative about future stock returns when there is a higher
likelihood of private information in stocks . . . .” ).
232
See Letter from Fahmi Quadir, Founder & CIO, Safkhet Cap. Mgmt., to
Jean-Pierre Bussalb, Head of Short Selling Section, Bundesanstalt f ür
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht [Federal Financial Supervisory Authority] (Mar. 15,
2019), https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/14c124c6-8b4b-4fce-aa5b4fc04834d 828/downloads/Safkhet%20Capital%20to%20BaFin%20on%20Short
%20Sale%20Ban.pdf?ver=1553002904959 [https://perma.cc/QQ4E-8PZD].
233
Safi Thind, “I Make Money by Finding Companies that Exploit People.” The
Woman Shaking Up Wall Street, SQUARE MILE (Feb. 7, 2020), https://
squaremile.com/features/fahmi-quadir-dirty-money-interview/[https://
perma.cc/7Z2H-JHRN].
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
Id.
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which Quadir was working made an enormous amount of
money off of this bet. But her research also brought to light the
extent of Valeant’s wrongdoing, a benefit for the financial markets and beyond.237
A primary policy justification for permitting short selling is
therefore to reap these efficiency benefits.238 Short selling is
also sometimes believed to contribute to market liquidity because it increases the number of shares being bought and sold
in the market.239 When considering how much short selling
should be allowed, the SEC weighs these potential benefits
against the potential negative impacts on the market. Foremost among potential negative effects are concerns about volatility in the form of large, disruptive swings in stock prices.240
When the market becomes aware that short sellers are shorting
a company’s stock, other investors may sell, accelerating the
price decline. The market may overreact to this signal, causing
drastic swings in the stock price. Another concern is that opportunities to profit from falling stock prices can create incentives for short sellers to make false claims about problems at a
company or engage in other manipulative practices.241 These
bad faith short sellers reduce market efficiency by spreading
false information or otherwise manipulating the market. We
see these concerns inform the SEC’s reasoning when developing its regulatory strategy for short selling.
The first regulation of short selling in the United States was
adopted in 1934.242 It was a reaction to the stock market crash
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237
Id.; see also Dirty Money: Drug Short (Netflix documentary series broadcast
Jan. 26, 2018) (describing Quadir’s short selling of Valeant stock).
238
James S. Chanos, Short Sellers Keep the Market Honest, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 22, 2008), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122204250955761325
[https://perma.cc/P8KH-YKDD] (“We need the shorts in the market for balance
so that we don’t have bubbles.” (quoting former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox));
Branson, supra note 229, at 72 (“Short sellers’ transactions help bring prices into
line with levels supported by those of the corporate issuers and the market’s
fundamentals . . . .”).
239
Amendments to Regulation SHO,Release No. 34-61595 75 Fed. Reg.
11,232, 11,235 (Mar. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242)242).
240
Charles R. Schwab, Restore the Uptick Rule, Restore Confidence, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 9, 2008), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122878208553589809
[https://perma.cc/PGR8-XWPH].
241
See, e.g., Elisabeth Braw, The Temptation for Cyber Attackers to Become
Short—Sellers, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2021) https://www.ft.com/content/5994947865e1-45bd-8c24-873c241cd3f1 [https://perma.cc/ZE5Y-LCYD] (describing how
hackers could create a problem within a company and then profit from shorting
the company’s stock).
242
YANEER BAR-YAM, DION HARMON, VEDANT MISRA & JOE ORNSTEIN, NEW ENGLAND
COMPLEX SYS. INST., REGULATION OF SHORT SELLING: THE UPTICK RULE AND MARKET
STABILITY 4 (2010), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b68a4e4a2772c2a
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in 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression, during which time
short selling stock appeared to have accelerated the declines in
already plummeting stock prices.243 In response, the newly
formed SEC adopted the “uptick rule.”244 The uptick rule mandated that short sales only be made on stocks whose prices
were increasing or, if the price was declining, the sale needed to
be made at a price higher than the last trading price.245 This
rule was designed to prevent investors from rushing to short
stocks that were already crashing, thereby further accelerating
the decline and contributing to volatility in the stock market.246
The uptick rule remained the only rule applicable to short
selling until the SEC promulgated Regulation SHO in 2005.247
The 2005 version of Regulation SHO did not change the uptick
rule, but rather authorized a pilot study of the potential effects
of repealing the rule.248
The study commissioned by the SEC in 2005 was designed
to determine whether the uptick rule benefitted or harmed the
functioning of the capital markets.249 To do so, it temporarily
suspended the uptick rule for a defined group of stocks. Suspending the uptick rule meant that short sellers could short
these stocks even when their prices were already declining.
The study then observed how removing the uptick rule restriction affected several measures of market health, including
price efficiency, liquidity, volatility, and market manipulation.250 Ultimately, the pilot study concluded that the uptick
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206180a1/t/5c0849e64fa51af588758070/1544047078449/NECSISECreport
Feb2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5C3-LQAX].
243
Id. at 3.
244
Rules for the Regulation of Short-Selling, 3 Fed. Reg. 213, 213 (Jan. 25,
1938).
245
Id.
246
Schwab, supra note 240 (describing the uptick rule as designed to “[limit]
the ability of short sellers to manipulate stocks lower by piling on, driving the
share price quickly down and quickly profiting from the downdraft they created”).
247
Key Points About Regulation SHO, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://
www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/regsho.htm [ https://perma.cc/XMR5-BRBF] (last
updated Apr. 8, 2015); 17 C.F.R. § 242.200–204 (2020).
248
Order Suspending the Operation of Short Sale Price Provisions for Designated Securities and Time Periods, Release No. 50104 (July 28, 2004), 69 Fed.
Reg. 48,032, 48,032 (Aug. 6, 2004). The 2005 regulation also implemented closeout requirements on short sales to address problems that had arisen from short
sellers selling shares short before they had located a share to borrow, resulting in
a failure to deliver. See Key Points About Regulation SHO, supra note 247.
249
Short Sales, Release No. 34-48709, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,972, 62,983 (proposed
Oct. 28, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242))(“The pilot would enable
us to study the effects of relatively unrestricted short selling on, among other
things, market volatility, price efficiency, and liquidity.”).
250
Id.
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rule had no significant impact on market behavior, meaning the
markets did not function better (or worse) without the uptick
rule.251 The SEC ultimately concluded this lack of effect on the
market justified repealing the uptick rule entirely. It did so in
July of 2007, creating more opportunities to short sell stock.252
In deciding to repeal the uptick rule, the SEC did not require a showing that removing the restriction would benefit the
market. Rather, it only required a showing that the market
would not be harmed.253 Beyond citing this largely neutral
result, the SEC reasoned that the markets had evolved since
the implementation of the uptick rule in 1938 such that this
restriction was no longer needed.254 Further, it noted that investors wishing to take a short position on a stock had other
options that were not subject to the uptick rule.255 An investor
can attain the financial result of a short sale without directly
borrowing and then selling the share. This can be accomplished using futures contracts. Given this other route by
which investors can take a short position, the SEC reasoned
that removing the uptick restriction would “level the playing
field” for investors seeking short positions.256 Importantly, this
does not refer to leveling the playing field between wealthy and
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251
See Amendments to Regulation SHO, Release No. 34-61595, 75 Fed. Reg.
11,232, 11,236 (Mar. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242)242)(summarizing the pilot study’s findings that the uptick rule did not have significant
impact on daily volatility, did not distort a security’s price, did not affect liquidity
levels, and did not affect price efficiency); see also Ekkehart Boehmer, Charles M.
Jones & Xiaoyan Zhang, Unshackling Short Sellers: The Repeal of the Uptick Rule
20 (Nov. 11, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/265996935_Unshackling_short_sellers_The_repeal_of_the_uptick_rule [https://perma.cc/7FMALLTQ] (concluding that “the uptick rule has only modest effects on short selling
activity, and in fact may improve liquidity and other market quality measures”).
252
Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55970, 72
Fed. Reg. 36,348, 36,348 (July 3, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242)
(“removing Rule 10a-1 and adding Rule 201 of Regulation SHO to provide that no
price test, including any price test by any SRO, shall apply to short selling in any
security”).
253
OFF. ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
SHORT SALE PRICE RESTRICTIONS UNDER THE REGULATION SHO PILOT 56 (2007) [hereinafter SHORT SALE PRICE RESTRICTIONS], https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2007/
regshopilot020607.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YFC-WG9L] (concluding that removing restrictions on short selling “on balance has not had a deleterious impact on
market quality or liquidity”).
254
Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, Release No. 34-55970, 72 Fed. Reg.
36,348, 36,351(“[T]oday’s markets are characterized by high levels of transparency and regulatory surveillance. These characteristics greatly reduce the risk
of undetected manipulation . . . .”).
255
Short Sales, Release No. 34-48709, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,972, 62,984 (proposed
Oct. 28, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242)).
256
Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, 72 Fed. Reg. at 36,350.
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LHABITANT, supra note 175, at 126–27.
Short Sales, 68 Fed. Reg. at 62,983(“We believe that to the extent possible,
consistent with investor protection, one market should not benefit over another
because of regulatory differences.”).
259
The ban on short selling lasted less than one month. See Louise Story, A
Debate as a Ban on Short-Selling Ends: Did It Make Any Difference?, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 7, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/08/business/08short.html
[https://perma.cc/P628-SCKH] (noting that the ban, which commenced on September 19, ended on October 8).
260
See BAR-YAM, HARMON, MISRA & ORNSTEIN, supra note 242, at 3.
261
See id. at 10.
262
17 C.F.R. § 242.201 (2020).
263
See Amendments to Regulation SHO, Release No. 34-61595, 75 Fed. Reg.
11,232, 11,233 (Mar. 10, 2010).
264
Id. at 11,244.
258
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ordinary investors. Instead, it refers to leveling the playing field
between (presumably wealthy) investors who want to short sell
directly and those who use futures contracts to create what are
often referred to as synthetic shorts.257 The SEC reasoned that
ensuring similar financial products are not subject to disparate
regulation was consistent with its mandate of investor protection.258 Thus, having failed to identify any market-health justification for expanding access to short selling, the SEC reverted
to the investor protection branch of its tripartite mission and
concluded that more investment opportunities are better for
investors. Of course, because short selling is largely only available to wealthy investors, wealthy investors are the only beneficiaries of this expanded access, creating one more source of
wealthy investors’ higher rate of return.
Somewhat ironically, this repeal came just over one year
before another historic market crash. Following the market
crash in 2008, short selling of financial stocks was temporarily
banned entirely out of fear that it would exacerbate the
crash.259 The 2008 market crash called into question the
SEC’s prior conclusion that short selling did not contribute to
extreme movements in stock prices and that markets had fundamentally changed since 1938.260 And so in 2010, the SEC
adopted the “circuit breaker” restriction.261 Inspired by similar
concerns as the uptick rule but less restrictive, the circuit
breaker restriction allows the short selling of stock whose price
is falling unless its price has fallen 10% in one day, at which
point short selling is not allowed.262 The market crash of 2008
appears to have convinced the SEC that short selling could, in
fact, harmfully contribute to market volatility.263 But the SEC
was not willing to return to the level of restriction that had been
in place from 1938–2007. Instead, it adopted the less-stringent circuit breaker restriction.264
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In sum, short selling faced its highest level of restrictions
from 1938–2007 via the uptick rule. Those restrictions were
removed entirely for most of 2007–2010 (save a brief short
selling ban in 2008). Since 2010, short selling has been subject to an intermediate level of restriction via the circuit breaker
test. More short-selling opportunities have been available
since 2007 than had been available in the prior seven decades
because the SEC deemed this expanded access to be consistent
with investor protection.
Regulatory motives diverge substantially when regulating
ordinary investors’ investments as opposed to those of the
wealthy and well-connected. Retirement savings—the only way
most ordinary Americans participate in the financial markets265—are regulated with an eye to reducing the risk to which
savers are exposed. Short selling, an exclusive financial practice, is regulated with an eye not only to reducing the risk to
which the markets are exposed, but also to expanding market
opportunities. The following Part considers the distributive implications of these divergent regulatory motivations.
III
EVALUATION AND ALTERNATIVES
A. The Consequences of a Divergent Regulatory Approach
1. The View from Within the Capital Markets:
Unproblematic
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265
See, e.g., Teresa Ghilarducci, Most Americans Don’t Have a Real Stake in
the Stock Market, FORBES (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/teresaghilarducci/2020/08/31/most-americans-dont-have-a-real-stake-in-thestock-market/?sh=4f0a7d7b1154 [https://perma.cc/HR44-3K24] (“The latest
available government data, via the Federal Reserve from 2016, shows a relatively
small share of American families (14%) are directly invested in individual stocks
but a majority (52%) have some market investment mostly from owning retirement accounts such as 401(k)s.”).
266
See, e.g., WILLIAM C. DUDLEY & R. GLENN HUBBARD, HOW CAPITAL MARKETS
ENHANCE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND FACILITATE JOB CREATION 2 (2004), https://
www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/ghubbard/Articles%20for%20Web%20Site/
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Capital market regulation focuses on protecting the investments of less-wealthy, less-sophisticated investors and maximizing the functioning of the capital markets. Regulators give
scant explicit attention to how a given financial practice may
affect the broader economy. The policy focus is instead based
on an assumption that what is good for the capital markets is
good for the entire economy. Indeed, there is substantial evidence to suggest that what is good for the capital markets can
be good for the broader economy.266 However, that is not al-
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ways the case.267 This means that thriving capital markets are
a means that can, in the right circumstances, lead to the ends
of a prospering economy. However, the markets are not the
ends in and of themselves. A regulatory approach that focuses
on the markets as the end regulatory goal will overlook the
instances in which growth of the capital markets does not serve
the broader economy.
One way in which growing markets could harm the broader
economy is by contributing to growing economic inequality.
And, indeed, in the United States in recent years, growing financial markets have coincided with growing economic
inequality.268
Examining the regulation of retirement savings and short
selling demonstrates that the well-being of the markets does
guide financial regulation in the United States, particularly
when regulating exclusive financial practices such as short
selling. If the well-being of the markets were the appropriate
end goal for capital markets regulation, the existing approach
of regulating both retirement savings and short selling would
seem to strike an appropriate balance and even address the
potential for distributive inequities. The following description
summarizes why.
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How%20Capital%20Markets%20Enhance%20Economic%20Performance
%20and%20Facilit.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4G8-EU4S] (“Our main thesis is that
well-developed capital markets generate many economic benefits, including
higher productivity growth, greater employment opportunities, and improved
macroeconomic stability.”); Geert Bekaert & Campbell R. Harvey, Capital Markets:
An Engine for Economic Growth, 5 BROWN J. WORLD AFFS. 33, 33 (1998) (finding
that capital markets are important for economic development); Rodrigo de Rato,
Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, Speech at the 3d International Derivatives
and Financial Market Conference: Economic Growth and Financial Market Development (Aug. 22, 2007), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/
04/53/sp082207[https://perma.cc/EB5Z-87YK] (emphasizing the importance of
financial markets in emerging economies).
267
See, e.g., Atif R. Mian, Ludwig Straub & Amir Sufi, The Saving Glut of the
Rich 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26941, Apr. 2020), http://
www.nber.org/papers/w26941 [https://perma.cc/U66C-RLM8] (finding that the
accumulation of financial assets by rich households has not boosted investment,
but rather has resulted in dissaving by the government and the rest of the household sector); see also Young Soo Lee, Han Sung Kim & Seo Hwan Joo, Financialization and Innovation Short-termism in OECD Countries, 52 REV. RADICAL POL.
ECONS. 259, 259 (2020) (finding that “as financialization advanced, the radicalness of technological innovation declined”); Christopher Hartwell, The Coevolution
of Finance and Property Rights: Evidence from Transition Economies, 51 J. ECON.
ISSUES 73, 73 (2017) (finding that in economies transitioning from communism to
capitalism, larger capital markets and financial sector wages negatively impacted
the development of property rights).
268
See infra note 274.
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Retirement savings are the predominant way in which ordinary Americans participate in the financial markets, and they
are a very important factor for financial security after retirement.269 Financial markets are complex and full of risks that
can be difficult to understand, and those investors whose only
exposure to the financial markets is their employer—sponsored
retirement plan may not fully understand all the risks involved.
For an investor of modest means, any losses sustained could
have dire consequences for the investor’s economic security
and quality of life. Thus, we regulate retirement savings in an
attempt to ensure: first that savers have all the information
they need to make good choices, and second that those who
manage retirement savers’ money are doing so prudently and
in a way that is designed to help the saver.
Short selling, on the other hand, is unavoidably risky. Our
financial regulatory scheme largely (although not entirely) limits this practice to investors with adequate resources to cushion the blow from any losses. Despite the risk involved, U.S.
regulators do not ban the practice because of the market benefits discussed above—price efficiency and liquidity.270 Short
selling regulation attempts to balance the efficiency and liquidity benefits with the volatility and manipulation costs. When
the effect of more short selling on the markets is neutral, regulation favors increasing investment opportunities. Short selling provides a financial benefit to many retirement savers from
the fees earned from share lending.271 This can result in some
retirement savers having more money—and therefore more economic security—at retirement than they otherwise would
have.
So, viewed from within the borders of the capital markets,
the United States’ general regulatory approach to these practices seems reasonable. It protects the investments of more
269
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See supra section II.B.1.
And most regulators around the world do the same. See, e.g., Alessandro
Beber & Marco Pagano, Short-Selling Bans Around the World: Evidence from the
2007–09 Crisis, 68 J. FIN. 343, 343 (2013) (noting that most stock exchange
regulators around the world reacted to the financial crisis by placing temporary
bans on short selling, implying that short selling is allowed in these countries in
normal market conditions); Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Opening Remarks at the UU.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Roundtable
to Discuss Short Sale Price Tests and Short Sale Circuit Breakers (May 5, 2009),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/shortsales/roundtable050509/shortsalesroundtable050509-transcript.txt [https://perma.cc/9ZST-PX9S] (“[L]egitimate
short selling can provide tangible benefits such as improved liquidity and pricing
efficiency.”).
271
See supra note 172.
270
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vulnerable investors and allows wealthy investors to engage in
the highly risky practice of short selling so long as the markets
are not harmed. However, when we step back and consider
these practices in light of wealth inequality trends, this marketfocused policy perspective appears incomplete; the means have
been mistaken for the ends.
2. The View from the Broader Economy: Problematic
Economic literature supports the idea that creating more
opportunities in the financial sector is good for the broader
economy.272 However, recent studies suggest that there is a
point after which further financial development correlates with
growing inequality.273 Indeed, according to the International
Monetary Fund’s measure of “financial development,” the
United States’ financial development has been growing in lockstep with its economic inequality since the 1980s.274 What has
been deemed good for the financial markets during this time
period has therefore not translated into economic opportunity
beyond the borders of the financial markets. So, we cannot
assume that more opportunities in the financial markets will
translate into widespread economic benefits.
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272
See, e.g., Financial Development, THE WORLD BANK, https://
www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr/gfdr-2016/background/financial-development [https://perma.cc/RRC9-P5T5] (last visited Feb. 23, 2021) (explaining
that financial sector development fosters economic development); Local Capital
Market Development, INT’L FIN. CORP., https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/
corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/solutions/products+and§ervices/
treasury-client-solutions/local-capital-market-development [https://perma.cc/
UY36-S25U] (last visited Feb. 23, 2021) (“Deep, efficient local capital markets
create access to long—term, local—currency finance, and are the foundation for a
thriving private sector—the key driver of jobs and growth.”).
273
Michael Brei, Giovanni Ferri & Leonardo Gambacorta, Financial Structure
and Income Inequality 5 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 756,
2018), https://www.bis.org/publ/work756.pdf [https://perma.cc/2H8J-PSTA]
(finding that “more finance . . . reduces income inequality but only up to a point.
Beyond that point, income disparity rises if finance is expanded via market-based
financing”); Michael Brei, Giovanni Ferri & Leonardo Gambacorta, How Finance
Affects Income Inequality, VOXEU (Mar. 7, 2019), https://voxeu.org/article/howfinance-affects-income-inequality [https://perma.cc/R63T-L32K], (noting that
“market-based financial development has been a driver of inequality in the financial systems of the common law countries”).
274
See Financial Development Index Database, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://
data.imf.org/?sk=F8032E80-B36C-43B1-AC26-493C5B1CD33B [https://
perma.cc/R9B5-9DV7] (last visited Feb. 23, 2021) (explaining the International
Monetary Fund measure of financial development and linking to historical data
for all countries, including the United States); GINI Index for the United States,
FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SIPOVGINIUSA
[https://perma.cc/RFW5-YEBS] (last visited Feb. 23, 2021); Chart (on file with
author) (showing correlation between financial development and the GINI coefficient (a measure of inequality) in the United States).
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See supra section I.A.2.
See Wolff, supra note 2,, at 52 tbl. 6. Roughly 50% of working age Americans have no retirement savings. See BROWN, SAAD—LESSLER & OAKLEY, supra
note 83, at 7. Over 70% of Americans have inadequate retirement savings. See
MORRISSEY, supra note 85, at 6.
277
See Wolff, supra note 2, at 21.
278
Id.
279
Importantly, this Article does not seek to prove that short selling specifically contributes to this trend. Rather, it serves as an example of how our current
regulatory focus does not take into consideration the fact that it, and other similarly exclusive practices, may contribute to these troubling trends.
276
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Economists anticipate that the growing wealth inequality
in the United States will have very adverse effects on future
economic prosperity.275 Most wealth in the United States is
held in the form of financial assets, and retirement savings are
the financial asset most commonly owned by ordinary Americans.276 Regulation aimed at protecting investors may have
the benevolent aim of protecting the wealth of the less wealthy,
but it does not remedy the fact that the financial wealth of the
wealthy tends to grow so quickly that ordinary investors may
never catch up.
As was discussed in section I.B.3 above, wealthy American
households not only have a lot more wealth than their lesswealthy counterparts, they also earn a higher rate of return on
their invested wealth.277 This creates two complimentary
mathematical forces that entrench wealth disparities: wealthy
investors not only earn returns on a larger pool of money; they
also earn more per dollar invested. This Article focuses on the
latter force. The higher average rate of return enjoyed by
wealthy investors is attributable to the wider variety of financial investments available to wealthy American families.278
More financial opportunities mean more opportunities to increase returns, and investment opportunities that are disproportionately available to the wealthy consistently earn a higher
rate of return than retirement savings. Short selling is among
those financial practices to which wealthy Americans have disproportionate access, and therefore it is likely a contributor to
this disparity in rate of return and thereby the entrenchment of
economic inequality.279 So, when the SEC acts to allow more
short selling (or any other exclusive financial practice) in the
market, they are contributing to this disparity in rate of return.
A policy focus that considers only the well-being of the
capital markets cannot account for this possibility. It acknowledges the potential market efficiency contributions of short
selling and the potential for deeper or broader financial markets to increase the size of the economic pie. However, it ig-
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nores how pursuit of that efficiency and breadth can provide
outsized financial gains to already wealthy investors, increasing disparities in how the pie is distributed. The current regulatory focus on market health creates more opportunities for
wealthy investors to secure and grow their economic lead.
The SEC’s actions in adopting and revising Regulation
SHO demonstrate how this can happen. Between 2003 and
2010, the SEC twice considered the circumstances under
which short selling should be prohibited. In both cases, the
principle guiding their inquiry was that they should allow as
much short selling as possible so long as the markets were not
harmed. In both cases, there was little to no evidence that
allowing additional short selling would improve the markets.280
But, so long as the net benefit was not negative, in the eyes of
the SEC, the amount of short selling should be maximized. The
expanded availability of short selling also means expanded opportunities for wealthy investors to grow their already substantial wealth.
It is highly unlikely that this additional short selling that
the SEC took pains to preserve facilitates widespread economic
prosperity. Retirement savers will save a bit more from the
additional share lending fees, but the economy-wide impact of
these savings are minimal.281 For example, in 2019, BlackRock managed $7.43 trillion in assets and made $617 million
in revenue from securities lending.282 This amounts to one
dollar earned for every $12,000 BlackRock manages. BlackRock is estimated to pass approximately seventy cents of each
of those dollars back to its investor clients.283 Clearly, an added annual return of seventy cents per $12,000 invested is
inadequate to close the gap in the rate of return earned by
ordinary and wealthy investors. This is why the disparity in
rate of return persists despite the nominal financial benefit
available to ordinary investors.
Beyond this small direct financial benefit to ordinary investors, short selling can have positive effects on market health,
which, in theory, can benefit the economy broadly. However,
the SEC’s inquiry into the matter suggested diminishing marginal benefits from increased access to short selling: the additional short selling that the SEC permitted via Regulation SHO
280
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See supra subpart II.D.
And there is no indication this benefit informed SEC decision-making
around Regulation SHO.
282
See BlackRock, Inc., supra note 172, at 2, 46.
283
See McCullough, supra note 203.
281
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was not shown to have any real effect on market efficiency or
liquidity.284 While having no discernable effect on market
health, the additional short selling permitted by SHO did add
more options to the wealthy investors’ menu of financial practices—the menu that offers a higher rate of return on larger
quantities of wealth. This higher rate of return works to entrench economic inequality, at tremendous cost to the economy. Capital markets, and their regulation, should promote
broad economic prosperity. When the markets contribute to
inequality, they impede broad economic prosperity. As the
SEC’s decision-making around Regulation SHO demonstrates,
the current focus of financial regulation does not account for
the ways in which the disparate availability of financial opportunities can accelerate the growth of wealth inequality. This
omission comes at great economic cost.
3. The Prevalence of this Divergence: A Regulatory Puzzle
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The divergence in regulatory objectives that exists between
short selling regulation and retirement savings regulation
exists throughout the market. The investments of ordinary investors—retirement accounts, mutual funds, publicly traded
securities—are regulated with a substantial emphasis on protecting less wealthy, less sophisticated investors who are perceived as more vulnerable. However, these investments of
small, unsophisticated investors will usually do little to improve market efficiency or liquidity. Most ordinary investors
are well advised to invest in broadly diverse mutual funds that
charge low fees.285 Among the safest of these options are index
funds which commit to invest in a diverse group of predetermined securities and do not engage in active trading.286 Because these funds do not actively trade their securities, their
contributions to market efficiency and liquidity are limited.287
Moreover, if ordinary investors do engage in more active investing, it is usually going to be in small quantities,288 meaning
that extensive research into the value of companies will rarely
284
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See supra subpart II.D.
BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE TIME-TESTED
STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 17 (12th ed. 2019) (“Investors would be far
better off buying and holding an index fund than attempting to buy and sell
individual securities or actively managed mutual funds.”).
286
Winston, supra note 170, at 715 n.48.
287
As pointed out by Professor James Tierney, contributions to and withdrawals from index funds and exchange traded funds may, indeed, have market efficiency and liquidity effects.
288
A necessary consequence of the wealth divide.
285
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See supra section I.B.4. But see Anat Alon-Beck, Alternative Venture Capital: The New Unicorn Investors, 787 TENN. L. REV. 983, 984 (2020) (addressing
policies surrounding the exclusion of retail investors from unicorn investments).
290
See supra note 105.
291
A few additional examples: high frequency trading, impact investing, private equity, and any securitized investment products.
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be cost-efficient and any trades will do little to move the market
price. Thus, ordinary investors’ investments contribute much
less to the market goals of efficiency and liquidity than the
larger investments of more sophisticated investors.
Investments that are more exclusive to the wealthy and
well connected, on the other hand, contribute more to market
efficiency and liquidity. Active trading requires time, resources, expertise, and the financial wherewithal to withstand
the increased risk. Wealthy investors are much more likely to
have these characteristics, or they can afford to pay someone
with these characteristics to manage their money. Because
risky investments—hedge funds, derivatives, futures contracts—are largely available only to the already wealthy (and
thus, it is presumed, the financially savvy), they are not regulated with an eye to protecting the investor from exploitation or
unexpected loss. Instead, they are regulated under the guiding
principle that more financial opportunities are better so long as
the market is not harmed. Countless examples of such practices exist beyond short selling.
One such example is venture capital investing. Investors
in venture capital funds make extraordinary returns a small
percentage of the time. So, an investor can make a lot of money
investing in these funds, but they have to be willing to lose their
entire investment sometimes. Ordinary Americans are therefore largely excluded from venture investing by both the accredited investor requirement and a lack of access.289 Activist
funds are another example. These are hedge funds that take
substantial positions in publicly traded companies and attempt to influence management so as to make the target company more profitable. Because they are private funds, ordinary
Americans are barred from investing in activist funds by the
accredited investor standard.290 Though, even absent that regulatory barrier, few ordinary investors would have the financial
resources to buy a stake in an activist fund.
Many other examples could be added to this list.291 Besides being predominantly available to wealthy investors, these
financial practices also have another important trait in common: they can all be justified on the grounds that they make
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the financial markets work better. Short sellers contribute to
price efficiency, venture investors provide capital to risky ventures to drive innovation, and activist investors monitor corporate managers. These “market improving” practices require
investors to take on substantial risk—risk that wealthy investors, by virtue of their wealth, are better positioned to bear.
The consequence is a market structure that grants wealthy
investors the responsibility to maintain market efficiency, and
in turn rewards them with high investment returns, allowing
them to multiply and entrench their already substantial
wealth.
Thus arises a challenging regulatory puzzle. Protecting
less wealthy investors means reducing the risk to which they
are exposed. However, doing so leaves all the opportunities for
above average returns in the hands of the already wealthy—a
phenomenon that can feed the growth of inequality.
This Article focuses on two pieces of this puzzle—retirement savings and short selling—as a starting point for analyzing regulatory decisions on both sides of this divide. However,
the broad divergence in regulatory motivations is not unique to
these two practices, and further inquiry into other financial
practices is warranted.
B. Existing Proposals: Expand Options for Ordinary
Investors?
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See supra note 124.
See Jay Clayton, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to the Economics Club of New York (Sept. 9, 2019) (“Congress and the SEC have long sought
to expand Main Street access to our private capital markets while preserving
investor protection. Recent initiatives include (i) Regulation Crowdfunding, (ii)
expanding Regulation A, and (iii) lifting the ban on general solicitation for Rule
506 offerings under Regulation D.”).
294
Amending the “Accredited Investor” Definition, supra note 116.
293
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The fact that wealthy American investors have a larger
menu of investments available to them, creating more opportunities for higher returns, is a widely recognized phenomenon.292 To date, most proposals to address this problem have
focused on expanding ordinary investors’ access to investments. Several recent SEC rules have sought to increase ordinary Americans’ access to investing in companies that are not
registered with the SEC.293 Recent changes to the accredited
investor standard are motivated by this same concern.294 A
number of scholars have likewise noted, with concern, the disparity in investment opportunity and proposed solutions that
would allow ordinary Americans access to more investment
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options.295 While many of these proposals are potentially beneficial, their impact on inequality trends is limited in a number
of ways.
The original justification for limiting ordinary investors’ access to unregistered investments is based on the fact that these
exclusive investments carry additional risk. It is a largely unavoidable axiom of investment that an investor must take on
more risk in order to make a greater return.296 American families that have little wealth to spare and are struggling to save
adequately for retirement are well advised to avoid risky investments.297 To a family with little wealth to spare, a large investment loss could be economically catastrophic. This is an
excellent policy motivation to prevent unsophisticated, nonwealthy investors from exposing their limited savings to extraordinary risk. Thus, complete equality of access to investment opportunities is not desirable.
Even with additional legal access to more investment opportunities, ordinary investors’ lack of access to financial advisors and well—connected social networks would still work as
barriers to many investment opportunities. So, ordinary investors will only be able to partially take advantage of any expanded access. With only partially expanded access, ordinary
investors will only partially close the gap in rate of return.
Moreover, the existing gap in wealth inequality means that ordinary investors have very little money to invest. So, those who
do take advantage of expanded investment access will do so
with a relatively small amount of money.298
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295
See, e.g., Rodrigues, supra note 117, at 3430 (arguing that the general
public should have greater access to the private securities market via mutual
funds); Krug, supra note 183, at 247–48 (arguing that regulation should facilitate
greater investment by retail investors in liquid alternative funds); Jasmin Sethi,
Another Role for Securities Regulation: Expanding Investor Opportunity, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 783,838 (2011) (arguing for expanding opportunities for
wealth creation through investment); Houman B. Shadab, Fending for Themselves: Creating a U.S. Hedge Fund Market for Retail Investors, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 251, 253 (82008) (proposing expanding access to hedge funds for
sophisticated retail investors); So-Yeon Lee, Why the “Accredited Investor” Standard Fails the Average Investor, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 987, 987 (2012)
(describing how private placement exemptions restrict investment by ordinary
investors).
296
See GUY FRASER-SAMPSON, NO FEAR FINANCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT FOR THE NON—FINANCE PROFESSIONAL 111 (2011) (“[G]enerally, a higher
return can be earned only at the expense of also accepting a higher level of risk.”).
297
See generally MALKIEL, supra note 285 (advising ordinary investors to invest
in broadly diversified passively managed mutual funds).
298
When the SEC recently expanded the definition of “accredited investor” to
include some sophisticated but not wealthy investors, it noted that this change
would have very little effect on the flow of capital to private companies. Amending
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In light of these combined forces, even if access to more
capital market opportunities could increase the average rate of
return for ordinary investors, its impact on ordinary Americans’ investments and therefore the wealth gap will be limited.
Recall that there are two complimentary forces that work to
entrench wealth disparities in the United States: the quantity
of wealth held by the wealthy and their greater average rate of
return on investments. Expanded access might lead to a
slightly higher rate of return for ordinary investors. It could
also expose ordinary investors to more risk of loss. Regardless,
wealthy investors will still have more wealth and investment
opportunities. This suggests that more changes are necessary
to reduce the capital markets’ contributions to wealth inequality trends. The following subpart describes another channel for
addressing this regulatory puzzle.
C. A New Proposal: Fewer Options for Wealthy Investors
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the “Accredited Investor” Definition, supra note 116 (“[I]t is unlikely that these
newly eligible investors will provide an additional, meaningful source of capital in
most private offerings.”).
299
@SEC_Investor_Ed, TWITTER (Feb. 13, 2021, 3:01 PM), https://twitter.com/SEC_Investor_Ed/status/1360680449413111811 [https://perma.cc/
47P9-YRKT].
300
See FINRA INV. EDUC. FOUND., INVESTORS IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL FINANCIAL CAPABILITY STUDY 23 (2019).
301
Id.
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Given that limitations exist to the distributive effects of
expanding ordinary investors’ access to higher risk investments, this Article concludes that academics and policymakers
must also take a look at the other side of the divide. That is, we
should inquire whether wealthy investors have access to too
many financial tools, rather than (or in addition to) asking
whether ordinary investors have access to too few.
In February 2021, the SEC’s Office of Investor Education
and Advocacy tweeted: “Don’t understand an investment?
Don’t invest in it.”299 Surely, that is prudent advice. However,
if followed, it will substantially limit the investment options of
many or most Americans, without the accredited investor standard. Many, or perhaps most, elite investment practices are
not widely understood by those not in the finance profession.300 In a 2018 survey, the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA) found that, among investors with investments other than their retirement accounts, only 22% could
correctly identify the definition of short selling in a multiple—
choice question.301 Given that only 15.3% of middle-class
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Americans have financial investments outside their retirement
accounts, it seems likely the vast majority of Americans do not
know what short selling is.302 This is not surprising, and the
same could likely be said for a large number of “sophisticated”
financial products and practices. Investors are well advised
not to invest in products they don’t understand, but expanding
financial markets usually means expanding more complex, less
widely understood practices. More elite investment options
mean more disparity in rate of return. Fewer elite investment
options mean less disparity in rate of return. This fact calls
into question the “more is better” approach to capital markets
regulation.
If limiting wealthy investors’ exclusive investment opportunities is a worthy goal, the next inquiry is what regulators can
do to facilitate this change. The history of Regulation SHO
suggests a starting point.
1. Application to Regulation SHO

303

Wolff, supra note 2, at 49 tbl.6.
See supra note 255.
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Considering whether wealthy investors have too many options is fitting when regulators face decisions about how much
of a financial practice should be allowed in the market. That
was precisely the type of decision the SEC faced when it considered the uptick rule when establishing and amending Regulation SHO. The SEC was not deciding whether to ban or allow
short selling. It was deciding whether to remove a restriction
and thereby make more short selling available in the market.
A study of the SEC’s reasoning when eliminating the uptick
rule and then re-establishing a less restrictive version demonstrates the extent to which it favors creating more financial
opportunities. Its decision was guided by a desire to allow as
much short selling as possible so long as it did not hurt the
market. When the effect on the market appeared neutral, the
regulatory impulse was to maximize the availability of this exclusive, risky financial practice by reducing the restrictions
placed on it. This decision was in part due to the fact that the
economic effect of short selling was available via other financial
products.303 While there is logic to that reasoning, such reasoning also facilitates the proliferation of exclusive, high-return
financial practices. If the existence of exclusive practices elsewhere justifies the creation of new exclusive investment opportunities, there is virtually no stopping point.
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The broader regulatory perspective advocated herein would
have resulted in maintaining the uptick rule. When the SEC’s
study of the matter concluded that removing the uptick rule
would have no discernable impact on market health, the conclusion would be to leave the uptick rule intact. There would be
no implicit presumption in favor of expanding the number of
financial practices in the market. Rather, there would be an
acknowledgement that short selling is disproportionately available to wealthy investors, that any increased access would disproportionately benefit wealthy investors, and that this would
work to entrench harmful wealth inequality trends. When
weighed against no discernable impact on the markets, the
clear conclusion under this new perspective would be to maintain the uptick rule and not expand access to short selling.304
2. Application Beyond Regulation SHO
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304
Just as implementing the original uptick rule and then partially reinstating
it in 2010 erewere consistent with the SEC’s mandate under the Exchange Act,
maintaining the uptick would be as well. This revised perspective takes into
consideration investor protection, market efficiency, and the public interest as
required by statute. Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3(f), 9(d).
305
The author did not choose Regulation SHO as a case study knowing in
advance that the SEC’s analysis showed a neutral impact on the markets. They
discovered that during research for the project. This makes it seem more likely
that other instances can be found of ties being broken in favor of creating more
financial opportunities.
306
See John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case
Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 888 (2015) (“[F]inance is at the heart
of the economy; it is social and political; and is characterized by non—stationary
relationships . . . . These features undermine the ability of science to precisely
and reliably estimate the effects of financial regulations, even retrospectively.”).
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The decision-making process around Regulation SHO represents the easy case. There was no market benefit expected
from expanding access to short selling. The lack of market
harm was deemed good enough. When that neutral result is
weighed against the dangers of wealth inequality, the analysis
is straightforward. There are likely other instances where the
SEC or other regulators have made or will make similar decisions guided by an implicit assumption that in the realm of
financial markets, more is better.305
However, the analysis will be harder when increasing financial opportunities shown or believed to positively impact
market health. At that point, under the new perspective, regulators would be faced with weighing the social good created by
better functioning markets against the social harm created by
perpetuating a driver of wealth inequality. It is likely impossible to precisely make that calculation.306 And doing so would
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not fit well within the existing parameters of cost-benefit analysis in SEC rulemaking. Thus, obstacles remain before capital
market regulation can consistently and effectively account for
wealth inequality.307 But those obstacles should not justify
ignoring the inequality impacts of financial market structure
and regulation. It simply means there is more learning to be
done before we get it right.308
A regulatory view that focuses only on market health and
market breadth assumes too much in terms of a large and
healthy market’s ability to foster widespread economic prosperity. Virtually every financial practice that is disproportionately
available to already wealthy investors will also have the ability
to exacerbate inequality trends. Entrenched economic inequality is inconsistent with the ultimate goals of financial markets
and thus cannot be ignored if we are to attain those ultimate
goals. The new regulatory perspective proposed herein would
allow regulators to explicitly consider how unequal financial
opportunities contribute to economic inequality.
D. Scope and Limitations of the Proposal
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307
As an independent agency, the SEC is not required to engage in formal
cost—benefit analysis as part of its rulemaking activities. See Memorandum from
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Div. of Risk, Strategy, & Fin. Innovation, and Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Off. of the Gen. Couns.,., to Staff,Rulewriting Div. & Offs. 3 (Mar. 16,
2012), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi_guidance_econ_analy_secrule
making.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LL7-DM63]. However, the D.C. Circuit, in reviewing SEC rulemaking, has consistently struck down or questioned SEC rules
based on inadequate cost-benefit analysis, suggesting thatcost-benefit analysis is
often required to withstand judicial scrutiny. See Richard L. Revesz, Cost-Benefit
Analysis and the Structure of the Administrative State: The Case of Financial
Services Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 545, 565––70 (2017).
308
See George A. Akerlof, Sins of Omission and the Practice of Economics, 58 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 405, 416 (2020) (“The norms regarding how economics should
be done should call for flexibility of methodology—instead of insistence on methodological purity that might be perfect for some Important problems but leaves
other problems and other approaches outside the domain of economic research.”).
309
See Matteo Gatti & Chrystin Ondersma, Can a Broader Corporate Purpose
Redress Inequality? The Stakeholder Approach Chimera, 46 J. CORP. L. 1, 10 n.39
(2020) (explaining that a multifaceted approach is required to address inequality).
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The new regulatory perspective proposed in the Article will
not solve the problem of economic inequality. Economic inequality is a large problem that requires attention from a number of angles.309 The proposals in this paper are directed at
capital market regulation. Therefore, they will have no direct or
immediate effects on the wealth of the many Americans who
currently do not participate in the capital markets.
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Nonetheless, we need to understand the mechanisms of
inequality entrenchment before we can hope to reverse it.
Moreover, reducing the tendency of the financial markets to
perpetuate wealth inequality matters. The financial markets
are where most Americans who have savings invest for the
future. Other tools may be necessary to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth in the United States. But, once a
family has the means to invest, the markets in which they
invest should not work against any distributive gains. An
economy that is sustainably fair requires financial markets
that do not promote wealth accumulation among a lucky few.
CONCLUSION
A close examination of the regulation of retirement savings
and short selling demonstrates how the usual policy framework for considering capital market regulation fails to consider
economy-wide distributional effects. A policy perspective that
stops at the borders of the capital markets will never be able to
account for the fact that additional investment opportunities
are also opportunities to entrench economic inequality. The
harmful social effects of entrenched economic inequality make
it imperative that academics and policymakers acknowledge
that financial practices that provide a net benefit to the capital
markets may nonetheless harm the economy by entrenching
economic inequality. When regulators make decisions about
how much of a financial practice to allow, this broader perspective will weigh against expanding access to financial products.
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